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ABSTRACT
A code has been developed for the comprehensive analysis
of a fault tree. The code designated UNRAC (UNReliability
Analysis Code) calculates the following characteristics of an
input fauTt tree:
a) minimal cut sets,
b) top event unavailability as point estimate and/or
in time dependent form,
c) quantitative importance of each component
involved, and
d) error bound on the top event unavailability
UNRAC can analyze fault trees, with any kind of gates (EOR,
NAND, NOR, AND, OR), up to a maximum of 250 components and/or
gates.
For generating minimal cut sets the method of bit manipu-
lation is employed. In order to calculate each component's
time dependent unavailability, a general and consistent set of
mathematical models is developed and the repair time density
function is allowed to be represented by constant, exponen-
tial, 2nd order erlangian and log-normal distributions. A
normally operating component is represented by a three-state
model in order to be able to incorporate probabilities for
revealed faults, non-revealed faults and false failures in
unavailability calculations.
For importance analysis, a routine is developed that will
rearrange the fault tree to evaluate the importance of each
component to system failure, given that a component and/or a
sub-system is unavailable (ie. down or failed). The impor-
tance of each component can be evaluated based on the instan-
taneous or average unavailabilities of each components. To
simulate the distribution of top event uncertainty, a Monte-
Carlo sampling routine is used. This method allows the user
to input uncertainties on the component's failure characteri-
stics (ie. failure rate, average test time, average repair
3time, etc.) and assign different distributions for subsequent
simulation.
The code is benchmarked against WAMCUT, MODCUT, KITT,
BIT-FRANTIC and PL-MODT. The results showed that UNRAC pro-
duces results more consistent with the KITT results than
either BIT-FRANTIC or PL-MODT. Overall it is demonstrated
that UNRAC is an efficient and easy to use code and has the
advantage of being able to do a complete fault tree analysis
with this single code.
Thesis Advisor: Norman C. Rasmussen
Title: Head of the Department of Nuclear
Engineering
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Reliability Concept and Methods of Evaluations
Reliability analysis is a method by which the degree of
successful performance of a system under certain stipulated
conditions may be expressed in quantitative terms. In order
to establish a degree of successful performance, it is
necessary to define both the performance requirement of the
system and the expected performance achievement of the system.
The correlation between these two can then be used to formu-
late a suitable expression of reliability as illustrated in
Fig. 1.1, Green and Bourne (1972).
Since both the required and achieved performance may be
subject to systematic and random variations in space and time,
it follows that the appropriate reliability expression is
generally of a probabilistic nature. Most definitions of
reliability, of which the following is the standard form
approved by the IEEE, takes this aspect into account;
(IEE.STD352 (1972))
"Reliability is the characteristic of an item
expressed by the probability that it will
perform a required function under stated condi-
tion for stated period of time."
The word "item" can cover a wide range in its use, i.e., it
could mean a single pressure switch or a large system.
The first step in a reliability analysis, therefore, is
to ascertain the pattern of variation for all the relevant
17
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performance parameters of the system both from the point of
view of requirement as well as from likely achievement. Per-
formance variations may be due not only to the physical
attributes of the system and its environment but also the
basic concepts, ideas and theories which lie behind the
system's design. Having established all the appropriate
patterns of variations, the system should be rigorously
examined to check its ability to work in the required way or
fulfill the correct and safe overall function. To do so,
the system should be analyzed as to when and how it may fail.
Failures may be partial or catastrophic which results in
partial or complete loss of operation or performance.
Failures may affect individual components or may cascade from
one component to another. Each type of failure will generally
lead to a different chain of events and a different overall
result. In order to establish the appropriate probability
expressions for each chain of events, it is useful to convert
the system functional diagram into a logic sequence diagram.
There are two ways to develop the system logic diagram,
1) positive logic
2) negative logic
In the positive logic, the chain of events consists of
a series of operational components or sub-systems that con-
stitute successful operations whereas in the negative logic
the chain of events are composed of component or sub-system
failure. The positive logic is called reliability block
19
diagram which has been used extensively during early designs
of satellites. The negative logic has acquired different
names depending on the types of logic interconnections.
They are:
1) fault tree logic
2) event tree logic
3) cause consequence chart logic
Reliability analysis by using the method of fault tree is the
most well known analytic method in use today for studying the
failure modes of complex systems. Of course, event tree and
cause consequence chart have also been used, however by
proper rearrangement, one can argue that the cause-consequence
chart (ccc) can be mapped into event-tree and fault tree com-
binations and both can be mapped into a set of fault trees for
which the Top events are the consequences of the ccc or event
tree, Evans (1974), Taylor (1974).
1.2 Fault Tree and Reliability Analysis
According to Haasl (1965), the concept of Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) was organized by Bell Telephone Laboratories as
a technique with which to perform a safety evaluation of the
Minuteman Launch Control System in 1961. Bell engineers
discovered that the method used to describe the flow of "cor-
rect" logic in data processing equipment could also be used
for analyzing the "false" logic which results from component
failure. Further, such a format was ideally suited to the
20
application of probability theory in order to numerically
define the critical fault modes.
From the time of its invention, FTA has been used
successfully to assess, qualitatively and/or quantitatively,
different safety studies involving complex systems. The
analysis begins with a well defined undesired event (failure
of the system to perform its intended function under given
condition) which is called the Top event. Undesired event
is identified either by inductive analysis or a failure mode
and effect analysis. In that, one proceeds to uncover the
various combination of 'simpler' events (i.e., sub-system and
component failure) whose occurrence quarantees the occurrence
of the Top event. The analysis stops at the level at which
the events are completely understood and quantitative informa-
tion regarding their frequency of occurrence is available.
These events are called the primary input of the tree. Figure
1.2 shows a typical structuring of a fault tree.
The reliability analysis in safety studies of nuclear
reactors using fault tree analysis was advocated in the early
1970's, Garrick (1970). In 1975, a unique and comprehensive
safety study on nuclear power plants using FTA was completed,
WASH 1400 (1975). In that study, the potential risk of nuclear
power plants to the public in the U.S. was estimated. Many
other countries have since used the same methodology as in
WASH 1400 to estimate their power plant risk, Ringot (1978).
Nuclear Engineering (1979). Today, fault tree is widely used
21
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as a principle structure for performing system reliability
calculations, i.e., risk analysis of advanced reactors
(Liquid Metal Fast Breeder, LMFBR), Burdick et al. (1977),
Waste Management Accidental Risk, Battelle (1976) etc. In
summary, fault tree analysis has been used extensively in
reliability analysis since its invention in 1961. Therefore,
in this study, we use fault tree to estimate the reliability
of the given system. Before entering the evaluation tech-
niques of fault tree, we refer the reader to the "Glossary of
Words" given at the end of this Chapter.
1.3 Fault Tree Evaluation
Fault tree evaluation refers to the analysis of the
system logic model provided by the fault tree. This analysis
can be either qualitative or quantitative or both.
1.3.1 Qualitative Analysis
Qualitative analysis is comprised of those analytical
procedures that do not require the assignment of probability
values to any of the events defined on the system logic.
Qualitative analysis tends to deal with the problem on a more
basic level and to identify fundamental relationships that can
be established from logic model without quantification. An
important aspect of qualitative analysis is to determine the
minimal cut sets for the Top event or some intermediate event.
The importance stems from the fact that determining minimal cut
sets is not only an analytic goal itself, i.e., finding all of
the fundamental ways that an event can occur, but it is a
23
required initial step in many other fault tree evaluation
techniques including quantification. Several computer pro-
grams have been designed to achieve this important goal. In
general, the codes have been developed in one of two ways. In
one development, the concept of Boolean Algebra has been
adapted -- Bennett (1975), Fussel et al. (1974b) --- i.e., SETS
by.Worrel (1975) and ELRAFT by Semanderes (1971), and in the
other the concepts of cut and path sets have evolved from
Coherent Structure Theory, Barlow, Proschan (1975), Vesely
(1970), i.e., PREP by Vesely and Narum (1970) and MOCUS by
Fussell, et al. (1974a)
Thus, a prime implicant of the Boolean function defined
by an equation of system behavior, Bennett (1975) and Henely
and Kumamoto (1978), corresponds to a minimal cut set obtained
from a system. structure function. Differences as well as
similarities occur in these approaches, but both are approp-
riate as long as an event and its complement cannot both occur
in each set.
Other codes in this category are: MODCUT (Modarres
(1979)), WAM-CUT (Erdmann (1978)), ALLCUTS (Van Sylke and
Griffing (1975)) and TREEL and MICSUP (Pande et al. (1975)).
1.3.2 Quantitative Analysis
As stated earlier, reliability analysis is of probablis-
tic nature therefore, a complete quantification of the system
is required in order to be able to assess a meaningful value
for the reliability of the system. In the fault tree analysis,
24
since the system structure logic is composed of a series of
negative (failure) logic, the term reliability is always
replaced by the term "unreliability." In a quantitative
sense, unreliability is a complement value of reliability. As
discussed in the previous section, generating the minimal cut
sets is the first step in any FTA. The second step in FTA is
to find the Top event unreliability by proper assignment of
probability values (data) to each basic events (components
failure).
The assignment of data described above will depend on the
type of results required. For example, if a point estimate of
the Top event failure probability is to be determined, then
the point estimates for the component failure probabilities
(or data allowing their computation) will have to be assigned.
Similarly, if a distribution is to be found for the Top event
unreliability, then one or more of the component characteris-
tics will have to be assigned in terms of a distribution.
Given the above data, the following quantitative evalua-
tions are generally useful in assessing a system reliability:
Numerical Probabilities: Probabilities of system and/or
component failure (point
estimate and/or time dependent
Quantitative Importance: Quantitative ranking of compo-
nents or cut sets to system
failure
Sensitivity Evaluation: Effect of change in models and
data, error bounding (multiple
25
point estimates, confidence
interval, distribution).
Having performed the above evaluations, a designer and/or a
user can compare the given systems and determine which will
probably be more dependent and have higher unreliability.
Hence, quantitative analysis is of great importance in
choosing the better system.
Several codes have been written for such evaluations.
Among them in FORTRAN are: KITT 1 and 2 (Vesely and Narum
(1970)), FRANTIC (Vesely and Goldberg (1977)), SAMPLE (WASH
1400 (1975)), LIMITS (Lee and Salem (1978)) and in PL/1 are:
PL-MODT and PL-MODMC by (Modarres (1979)). The above men-
tioned FORTRAN codes need minimal cut sets or related system
structure function as input, and each of them has certain
limitations in their applicability to different systems. For
example, although KITT is always coupled with PREP for its
minimal cut sets requirement, the coupled code is unable to
accommodate the periodically tested components as input and to
evaluate error bounds on the Top event. On the other hand, the
FRANTIC code can accommodate all types of monitoring situa-
tions, i.e., non-repairable, repairable, periodically tested
etc., but it requires the system structure function as input and
it is incapable of evaluating the error bound. In addition,
the approximations used in the code greatly overestimates the
system unreliability when the failure rates are greater than
10-3 per hour. Finally, SAMPLE and LIMITS can only be used for
26
error propagation given the average unreliability of each
event and require the system structure function as an input.
In the case of PL-MOD series codes, both codes should be used
to calculate all three aforementioned evaluations.
1.4 Objective of Thesis
To assess the reliability of different designs, one has
to perform a complete qualitative and quantitative analysis
of the respective designs. The probablistic values for the
comparison are the evaluations that were discussed in the
previous section. Several codes have been written by dif-
ferent authors to do such calculations, (see Section 1.3.1 and
1.3.2). Unfortunately, to do a complete job one has to use
two or three different codes depending on the type of results
desired. Therefore, the chance of making an error in the
preparation of the input data will greatly increase. Hence,
there is an incentive to prepare a single package composed of
different codes in order to minimize the confusion and error
that arise in using combination of the codes.
The objective of this thesis is to develop a code which
can evaluate the system unreliability (point estimate and/or
time dependent), find the quantitative importance of each
component involved, and calculate the error bound on the
system unreliability evaluation. To prepare such a code, the
methodologies used in REBIT (Wolf (1975)), KITT (Vesely (1970)),
FRANTIC (Vesely and Goldberg (1977)), SAMPLE (WASH 1400
(1975)), LIMITS (Lee and Salem (1978)) codes were implemented.
27
For generating minimal cut sets, a portion of REBIT which is
called BIT is used. BIT, at the beginning, was limited to 32
components and gates and only would accept AND or OR gates
logic. For this study, it has been modified to accept any
kind of gate logic and its capability has been increased at
the present time to 250 components and/or gates. However,
this capability could be increased to any number required.
For the quantification, a general and consistent set of mathe-
matical models for the component failure were developed and
FRANTIC.code was restructured to accommodate these models.
For the components' important analysis, the differentiating
method (the methods of Birnbaum) and Fussell-Vesely methods
(Lambert (1975)) were implemented. Finally, for error propa-
gation analysis, we developed a routine that allows the simu-
lation to be carried out on the component's failure parameters
(failure rate, repair rate, test rate, etc.) as well as on the
average components unreliability.
1.5 Structure of Thesis
Chapter 2 discusses the basic concept of the reliability
analysis. In particular, it will show how different mathemati-
cal models can be used in the calculation of the time dependent
reliability and/or unreliability of a system or component.
Chapter 3 explains the principle structure of the code
developed in this study to accommodate all the models discussed
in Chapter 2. The code calculates the unreliability of any
system given its fault tree and is called Unreliability
28
Analysis Code (UNRAC). In addition, it will discuss how the
method of moment matching will be helpful in approximating the
Top event distribution. Furthermore, two methods of accommo-
dating the dependencies in the fault tree will be discussed.
Chapter 4 presents a series of examples to insure the
effectiveness of models encoded and compares some of the
WASH 1400 results with the time dependent values calculated by
this study.
Finally, Chapter 5 contains the summary and conclusion of
this study and it will discuss the appropriate recommendation
for further studies.
1.6 Glossary of Words
In this section, we present a list of standard terminology
that is in use today for any fault tree analysis. Most of the
symbols and terminology defined herein are taken from IEEE-STD-
352 (1972).
1. Basic Event of Fault: Basic Fault event is an event
that requires no further development. In the fault
tree, Basic event is represented by a circle. The
probability of such event is derived from empirical
data or physics of failure analysis.
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2. Faults Assumed Basic to the Given Fault Tree: This
type of event is shown by a diamond in a given fault
tree. The possible causes of this event are not
developed either because it is not required or the
necessary information is unavailable.
3. Resultant Events: The rectangle represents an
event that results from the combination of events of
the type described above through the input of a logic
gate.
L I 1
4, AND Gate: AND gate describes the logical operation
whereby the coexistence of all input events is
required to produce the output event. In other words,
an output event occurs if and only if all the input
occurs. OUTPUT
I INPUT
S. OR Gate: OR gate defines the situation whereby the
output event will exist if one or more of the input
event exists. That is, an output event occurs if one
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or more of the input occur.
$ OUTPUT
INPUT
6. Exclusive OR (EOR) Gate: This gate functions as an
OR gate with the restriction that specified inputs
cannot coexist. ( OUTPUT
ir INPUT
7. Transfer Gates: The transfer symbol provides a tool
to avoid repeating sections of the fault tree. The
"Transfer out" gate represents the full branch that
follows it. It is represented by a symbol, say b,
and indicates that the branch is repeated somewhere
else. The "Transfer in" gate represents the branch
(in this case b) that is already drawn somewhere
else, and instead of drawing it again, it is simply
input at that point. The transfer gate is shown by a
triangle in the fault tree.
TRANSFER: f u
8. Failure: The termination of the ability of an item to
perform its required function. In general, there are
two types of failure:
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a) Revealed (announced) failure. A failure of an
item which is automatically brought to light on
its own occurrence.
b) Unrevealed failure. A failure of an item which
remains hidden until revealed by some thorough
proof-testing procedure.
9. Failure Rate: The expected number of failures of a
given type, per item, in a given time interval.
10. Mutually Exclusive Events: Events that cannot exist
simultaneously.
11. Repair Rate: The expected number of repair actions
of a given type completed per unit of time.
12. Test Interval: The elapsed time between the initia-
tion of identical tests on a same item.
13. Test Schedule: The pattern or testing applied to the
parts of a system. In general, there are two pat-
terns of itnerest:
a) Simultaneous: Redundant items are tested at the
beginning of each test interval, one immediately
following the other.
b) Perfect Staggered: Redundant items are tested
such that the test interval is divided into equal
sub-intervals.
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14. Logic Diagram: A diagram shown in a symbolic way
the flow and/or processing of information.
15. Primary Failure: Basic event failure is called
Primary failure.
16. Cut Set: is the set of the basic event whose simul-
taneous failure guarantees the top event failure.
17. Path Sets: is the set of the basic event whose
success guarantees the system success.
18. Minimal Cut Set (Mode failure, Critical Path): is
the smallest set of primary failures such that if all
these primary failures simultaneously exist, then the
Top event failure exists.
19. Secondary Failure: is a failure due to excessive
environmental or operational stress placed on the
system element.
20. Confidence Level: the probability that the asser-
tion made about the value of the distribution
parameter, from the estimates of the parameter, is
true.
II
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CHAPTER 2: ON THE ESSENTIAL OF RELIABILITY ~.
PROBAB I LITY THEORY
2.1 Introduction and Basic Concepts
System reliability is a measure of how well a system
performs or meets its design objective. If successful opera-
tion is desired for a specified period of time, reliability
is defined as the probability that the system will perform
satisfactorily for the required time interval.
Historically, reliability has usually been considered
during system design, but it acquired more attention first
in radar design in early 1940 and then in design of the
Minuteman and satellite systems. Most of the mathematical
models used to help better understand system reliability have
been studied by the pioneers in this field and their applica-
tions have been tested during the aforementioned designs.
This work is an effort to further develop the analytical
methods that have been established earlier by such authors as:
Cramer (1946), Feller (1957), Parzen (1960), Cox (1963) and
Takacs (1957).
Therefore, in this Chapter, we discuss the essentials of
reliability and probability theory that will be used in
developing the model in succeeding Chapters. To do this, we
first define the measure(s) of system effectiveness and then
discuss the appropriate theory and mathematical model to
determine these measures.
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In general, the measures of system effectiveness are
criteria by which alternate design policies can be compared
and judged, i.e., alternate design policies for an Emergency
Safety feature may be judged on the probability of actuation
detection and/or instantaneous availability of the system.
However, there are many problems associated with developing
measures of effectiveness. In the first place, it is not
always possible to express quantitatively all the factors of
interest in a model. Secondly, the measures of the system's
effectiveness can change with time. What may be effective
today may not be tomorrow due to technological and political
innovations. Today there are four major measures of
system reliability effectiveness. These are:
1) Availability
This measure is applicable to maintained systems.
There are several measures of availability in use
today, which we can categorize as:
a) Instantaneous Availability: The probability
that the systems will be available at any random
time t.
b) Average Up-Time: The proportion of time in a
specified interval (O,T) that the system is
available for use.
c) Steady-State Availabiltiy: The proportion of
time the system is available for use when the
time interval considered is very large.
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In the limit, a) and b) approach the steady-state
availabiltiy c). Which measure to choose depends
upon the system mission and its condition of use.
2) Probability of Survival
The probability of system survival is a measure of
the probability that a system will not reach a com-
pletely failed state during a given time interval,
given that at the beginning of the interval the
system was in a fully operable state. The approp-
riate use for the probability of survival as a
measure of system reliability effectiveness occurs
in those systems where maintenance is either not
possible during operation or can only be performed
at defined times, i.e., equipment in the reactor
building. This measure is highly dependent upon
system configuration and the condition of maintenance.
In general we would expect a doubly redundant
system to have a higher survival probability than a
non-redundant system. Also, we should expect to have
a higher survival probability where repair on a
redundant system is being performed immediately upon
the inception of the failure of one of the parallel
equipment trains, than where repair is not begun
until all equipment reaches a failed state. We shall
henceforth denote the latter case as a non-maintained
and the former case as a maintained system.
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3) Mean Time to System Failure
The literature on reliability contains such terms as
Mean-Time-Between-Failure (MTBF), Mean-Time-To-
Failure (MTTF) and Mean-Time-To-First-Failure (MTTFF).
These terms do not describe the same thing. MTBF is
specifically applicable to a population of equipment
where we are concerned with the average time between
the individual equipment failures. When we are
interested in one component or system, the MTTF and
MTTFF are applicable. The difference between MTTFF
and MTTF is the specification of the initial condi-
tion and how time is counted. The difference becomes
apparent when dealing with redundant systems under
different maintenance conditions. For non-maintained
system, MTTF is a measure of expected time the system
is in an operable state before al-1l the equipment
reaches a failed state and the time is counted from
initial fully operable to final failed state. For a
maintained system, MTTFF is a measure of the expected
time the system is in an operable state given that
all equipment was initially operable at time zero.
4) Duration of Single Downtime
For some systems, the duration of a single downtime
may be the most meaningful measure of system relia-
bility effectiveness. For example, an air traffic
control system which establishes flight plans and
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directs landing and take-off, a long duration of
single downtime may mean queuing at take-off,
schedule delays, lost flights and so on. In reactor
safety, long downtime of an emergency system may
require the shut down of the reactor.
In selecting a measure of effectiveness, we should keep
in mind that the measure will have little value if one is
unable to express it quantitatively in order to compare
between alternate designs. To be able to express these mea-
sures quantitatively, we need to model each equipment or
component of a system according to its maintenance policy.
Each component can come under the following two major cate-
gories:
1) non-maintained
2) maintained.
In one approach, Vesely and Goldberg (1977), the compo-
nents are classified according to the type of failure rates
and the manner in which repair policies are executed. The
Vesely and Goldberg (1977) classification is as follows:
Class 1: Component with constant unavailability
Class 2: Component with unrepairable policy (non-
maintained)
Class 3: Component with repair in which the faults are
immediately detected (maintained)
Class 4: Component with repair in which the faults are
detected upon inspection, i.e., periodically
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maintained component (maintained).
As we can see, there is not much difference between the
above classification and the two major repair policies.
Therefore, in the following sections we discuss the mathemati-
cal models for non-maintained and maintained components.
2.2 Reliability Model of Non-Maintained Systems
When a fixed number, N, of identical systems are
repeatedly operated for t amount of time, there will be Ns(t)
systems that survive the test and NF(t) that fail. The
reliability, R(t), of such a collection of systems can be
expressed as:
Ns(t)R(t) = Ns(t) + NF(t) (2.1)
or equivalently
R(t) = 1 - NF(t)(2.2)
N
letting N be fixed we can write
dNF(t) = N dR(t)23)
- (2.3)
where dNF(t) is the rate at which systems fail. Now if we divide
both sides of Eqn. (2.3) by Ns(t), and denote the left hand side
by r(t)
1 dNF(t) t N dR(t)r(t) Nst) NF(t) Ns dRt (2.4)dt dit
39
then r(t) is the instantaneous probability of failure. By
simple manipulation of Eqn. (2.4) we get
R(t) = exp (- r(x) dx) (2.5)
O
The function r(t) is called the failure rate function, hazard
function or hazard rate.
A study of many systems (Mechanical, Electronic, (Davis
(1952)), during their normal life expectancy has led to the
conclusion that their failure rate follows a certain basic
pattern. (See Fig. 2.1)
It has been found that systems exhibit a high failure
rate during their initial period of operation. These are
failures which are typically caused by manufacturing flaws and
this initial period is called the infant mortality or break
in period. The operation period that follows infant mortality
has a smaller failure rate which remains approximately con-
stant until the beginning of the Wear-out period. Most of
the components in use are considered to have constant failure
rates and the failures generally result from severe, unpre-
dictable and usually unavoidable stresses that arise from
environmental factors such as vibration, temperature shock,
etc. Therefore, in this study we assume a constant failure
rate r(t) = A, for any component. Hence from Eqn. (2.5) we
have
RCt) = exp (-Xt) (2.6)
A_
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and if we assume that the system or the component under study
has a failure density function of f(t) and failure distribu-
tion function F(t) we have
f(t) = dF( = - dR = exp(-Xt)
where f(t) is an exponential failure time density function.
Therefore, for a non-maintained component or system, the
reliability function is given by Eqn. (2.6) and unreliability
by:
F(t) = 1 - R(t) = 1 - exp(-Xt) (2.7)
and the mean time to failure (MTTF) is given by:
MTTF =j tf(t)dt = 1/A
2.3 Reliability Model of Maintained Systems
2.3.1 Introduction
When we allow repair during the desired interval of
operation, the concept of reliability is usually replaced by
the concept of instantaneous availability which is defined as
the probability that the system is in an acceptable state at
any time, t, given that the system was fully operable at time
t = O. Another important measure in a maintained system is
system downtime, which is defined as the total time from
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system failure until return to service. Service or repair
downtime is generally divided into two basic categories:
1) Active repair time
2) Administration time
Active repair time can be divided into recognition or
detection time, fault location or diagnosis time, correction
or repair time and verification or final malfunction check
time. Administrative contribution to downtime is that time
required to obtain a spare part, or is spent in waiting for
maintenance crew, tools or test equipment. The time required
to perform each of these categories varies statistically from
one failure instance to another and there usually exists a
large number of relatively short-time and a small number of
long-time repair periods. However, in modeling a maintained
system, the repair downtime is frequently represented by one
of the following probability density functions:
.1) exponential
2) log normal
3) gamma
In this study we assume g(t) to represent the general
repair time density function, the mean downtime or Mean-Time-
To-Repair (MTTR) is denoted by:
0tgt)dt (2.8)
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and the probability that a failed system returns to service by
some time T is given by:
Pr {downtime < T = f g(t)dt (2.9)
For evaluating the system unavailability one can use the
following two methods:
1) differentiating method applicable for simple failure
and repair distribution
2) Semi-Markovian method for more complex distribution
and system.
In this section, we discuss the differentiating method
for a two-state system with failure and repair time density
functions. At any time, t, the system is in one of the
following states with probability, say, Pi(t), i = 1,2.
State 1: The system is up
State 2: The system is down
g(t) = pe Pt repair distribution where . is the
repair rate.
If the system is in state 1 at time t, the probability
that the system does not go to state 2 before t + At is equal
to the reliability of the system and is:
-XAte =1 - XAt + O (At),
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where O(At) is a quantity having the property that
lim O(At) = 0. If the system is in state 2 at time t,
AT+O At
the probability that the system remains in state 2 before
t + At is equal to (from Eqn. (2.9)) e- PAt = 1- pAt+ O(At).
Therefore, in order for the system to be in state 1 at some
time t + At, either it must be in state 1 at time t and no
failure occurs in the interval (t, t+ At), or it is in state 2
at time t and it is repaired during (t, t+ At). Thus:
Pl(t+ At) = Pl(t)[1- At] + P2(t) pAt + O(At)
or P1 (t+ At) - P1(t)
At
= PP2(t) - A~l~t) + O(At)
= P2(t) XPl(t) + At)
letting At + 0
Pl(t) - P2 (t) - XPl(t)
where
P dPl(t)
Pl(t ) dt
But we know that Pl(t) + P2 (t) = 1
'*. Pl(t) = - (X + )Pl(t)
(2.10)
(2.11)
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Eqn. (2.11) is a simple differential equation with initial
conditions of Pl(o) = 1, P2(o) = 0, Hence
X PI~
Pl(t) = T-;- + T exp[-(X+p)t]
The instantaneous availability of the system is equal to
Pl(t):
A(t) = Pl(t) --- + exp[-(X+p)t] (2.12)
The term steady state availability is used when the
mission period is much larger than MTTR.
ASs(t) = A(-) P MT- MTTF (2.13)
p+X MTTR+ MTTF
Note: In the above discussion we assume the unit (system) is
as good as new after repair or replacement.
In a more general case, the method of repair as a renewal
process has been used by Barlow and Hunter (1961), Cox (1963),
Takacs (1959) to evaluate the up and down state probabilities
of a unit (system) by developing a detailed mathematical model
to inter-relate failure and repair distributions to the
probabilities. To prevent duplication of the method, we only
show the modified result of state and transition probabilities
for a two-state system. Let F(t) be the failure probability
distribution and Gt) be the repair probability distribution.
By vitue of the state diagram shown in Fig. 2.2 one can write:
(for proof see Rau (1970)).
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F (t)
G(t)
state 1: is Up State
state 2: is Down State
F(t): Failure Probability Distribution
G(t): Repair Probability Distribution
Fig. 2.2: A simple two-state transition diagram.
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p* = F*(s) [l-G*(s)G
12(s) S[1- G*(s)F*(s)]
G*(s) [-F*(S)]
P* 2(s)= ' 1- F*(s) 
P1 (s)- S[1- G*(s)F*(s)]
Pe 2() s[rI1 - G*(s)P2( s ) -= Si - G(s)F*(s)]
K*(s)
Pi (s)
Pij(t)
(2.14)
(2.15)
(2.16)
(2.17)
is the Laplace transform of K(t), K=f,g
is the Laplace transform of Pij(t), i,j=1,2
= Pr .system is in state j at time t given in
state i at time 01
If we assume exponential distribution for both failure
and repair, the inverse transform of equation (2.16) will
yield Eqn. 2.12).
If f(t) = e Xt and g(t) = (constant repair) then one
can show
P11 (t)
[t/] xj(t- j)i e-A( t - [j )
j=o jl
[t/B] is the largest integer less than or
(t/B).
[2.18]
equal to
One should note that it is not always easy to find the
inverse transform of P(s) except for special cases (which
we m ntioned above) nd typically one must use numerical
we mentioned above) and typically one must use numerical
where
where
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technique to find Pij(t).
2.3.2 Semi-Markovian Model
In the last section, we discussed a method which is only
applicable to a two-state system. In general, a system is
comprised of different components and each component is subject
to a certain inspection-repair-replacement policy. Therefore,
a more general model is needed to handle a complex system.
One of the models which has been used successfully in the past
two decades is the Markovian model. The application of this
model in reliability analysis can be found in numerous ref-
erences, some recent ones being: Kemeny and Snell (1960),
Barlow and Proschan (1965), Shooman (1968), Green and Bourne
(1972). In this section, we utilize the model discussed by
Howard (1972). Basically, Markovian models are functions of
two random variables; the state of the system i and the time
of observation t. A discrete parameter stochastic process
{X(t); t=0,1,2,...} or a continuous parameter process
{x(t); t>0} is said to be a Markov process if, for any set of
n time points, t, where tl<t 2<... tn7 in the index set of the
process and any real numbers, xl,x2,.. .xn;
Pr[X(tn )X(tn XnIX(t 1) = x1 X(-n-1) = Xn-l]
(2.19)
P r[X(t) < XnlX(tn l)I= Xnl]
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P1 1
A typical transition diagram.Fig. 2 :
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Central to the theory of Markov process models are the
concepts of state and state transition. In reliability
analysis, a state can often be defined simply by listing the
components of a system which are working satisfactorily. And,
in general, the number of distinguished states depends on the
number and function of the system equipment. In the model we
will always consider a finite number of states.
The manner in which the states are interchanged in the
course of time is called transition. As we can see from the
general Markov process, equation (2.19), only the last state
occupied by the process is relevant in determining its future
behavior. Thus, the probability of making a transition to
each state of the process depends only on the state presently
occupied. If we denote Pij to be the transition probability,
by definition we have:
Pij = Pr{S(n+l) = jS(n) = i} l< i,jn (2.20)
n=0,1,2, ...
and it is defined as the probability that a process presently
in state (S(.)) i will occupy state j after its next transi-
tion, see Fig. 2.3.
Another quantity which is always needed in dealing with
a Markov process is the state transition probability denoted
by ij(n) and is defined to be the probability that the process
will occupy state j at time n given that it occupied state i
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at time O, or
ij(n) = Pr{S(n) = jS(O) = i} l<i,j<N (2.21)
n=0,1,2,...
Both Pij and ij(n) have the following properties:
1) O <ij(n), Pij< I lvij<N
N (2.22)
2) . *ij(n) 1 i,j=1,2...N
~j n=0,1,2...
N
E Pij - 1
j=l 
In the above equations N is the total number of states
and n is the number of transition steps in time.
Having defined Markov processes, we can relate the afore-
mentioned definitions to the continuous time Semi-Markov
process. The Semi-Markov process is a process whose succes-
sive state occupancies are governed by the transition
probability of a Markov process, but whose stay in any state
is described by a positive random variable, Tij, that depends
on the state presently occupied, and the state to which the
next transition will be made, j. The quantity Tij is called
holding time and has a holding time density function hij(t).
One can also define an unconditional waiting time density
function of state wi(t) by
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N
w i (t) = 1 pij hi (t)
jl P 3
(2 . 23)
for the cases when we do not know the successor state. By
virtue of equations (2.20), (2.21), and (2.23) one can write:
Oij(t)= -ij
N
ccw (t)+N 
k= i k JO
dz hik(T)kj (t2-T)
(2. 24)
i,j=l,2...,N
Pij (t) = is the probability that the process will
occupy state j at time t given that it
entered state i at time 0.
6ij = Kronecker delta = { i=j
ccwi(t) = cumulative complementary distribution of
wi(.) and is the probability that the process
will leave its starting state i at time
greater than t.
The physical meaning of terms in Eqn. (2.24) can be defined as:
first term = Probability that the process will end up in
state j by one step during (0O,t)
second term = Probability that the process makes its first
transition from the starting state i to some
state k at some time T,DO<<t, and then
proceeds somehow from state k to state j in
the remaining time t- T. This probability
is summed over all states k and time 0 to t.
Where
t>i
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One can solve the Equation (2.24) by two methods:
1) Method of matrix manipulation
2) Method of flow graph theory
In this section we discuss the first method. If we take
the Laplace transform of equation (2.24) we will have:
ij (s) = 6ij cc Nwi(s) + Pik hik(s) 'kj (S)k=l
and in matrix form
0(s) = [I-pOH(s)]-l CcW(s)
- (4ij (s))
= (Pij)
= (hij (s))
= (CC(s))
I= identity Matrix
The right hand side of equation (2.25) consists of known
functions of s and one can find (s) analytically or numeri-
cally depending on the degree of complexity of the holding
time distributions. To demonstrate the application of
equation 2.25) we consider a general two-state unit with
holding distribution and transition probabilities shown in
the following figure.
(2.25a)
Where:
(2.25b)
(s)
H(s)
CCw(s)
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P1 2 h12(t)
By comparison with Fig. 2.2 we have:
h1 2 (t) = f(t)
h2 1(t) = g(t)
and in addition
w(t) = hl2(t),
N = 2
P = 10
cc
W = 1 -
t
h1 2(t)dt
0
Then by simple manipulation we find,
for example, i = 1, j = 1,
CC
wi(s)
1-h (s) h(s)12 212
l-h 12(s)
s[l-h 12 (s) h21 (s)]
replacing h1 2(s) and h21(s) with F*(s) and G*(s) we get
$11(s) = [- F*(s)S[1-F(s) G*(s)]
which is the same as equation (2.16). Hence by using
equation (2.24) we can generate our probability function and
find the respective availability. For further examples we
refer the reader to Howard (1972).
11 (s) =
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2.3.3 Flow Graph and Mason's Rule
When dealing with a set of algebraic equations such as:
allXl+al2X2+al3+X3+a4X 4 - b1
a21Xl+a 22X2+a23X3+a24X4 = b 2
a31Xl+a32X2+a3X3+a 34X 4 = b3 (2.26)
a41Xl+a42XZ+a43X3+a a44X = b 4
The a's may be regarded as system coefficients, the b's as
input and x's as output. If the equations are solvable, they
can be rearranged such that one output variable with a coef-
ficient of unity is separated from each equation. In set
(2.26) above let us solve the first for X1, the second for X2
etc.
1 al1 (bl-a 1 2X 2-a 1 3X 3 -a 14X4)
11
2 a22 (b2 -a21Xl-a23X 3-a24X4)
22 (2.27)
x3 a3 (b3'a31Xl-a 32X2-a34 X4)
33
X4 a44 (b4 -a4 1Xl-a 4 2 x2-a 4 3X 4 )
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show two different flow graph arrangements
equivalence of Eqn. (2.27). As we can see, both flow graphs
are cluttered to the point of incomprehension. These types of
flow graphs are typical when one uses the Markovian model to
calculate the system reliability. Therefore, if the systems
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XA
Fig. 2.4: Flow graph of Eqn. (2.27), (Henley
and Williams (1973)).
, ! ask
Fig. 2.5: Flow graph of Eqn. (2.27)(Henley
and Williams (1973)).
X4
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are large, it is difficult to extract information from graphs.
Two potential solutions to this problem are (1) eliminate
the graphs and use their Matrix equivalence, or (2) reduce
the graphs by combining arcs and nodes (i.e., transition and
states). Here we discuss the flow graph reduction technique.
Flow graph reduction is a technique whereby a complex
graph is reduced to a simpler, yet equivalent, form called a
residual graph. The reduction process involves the applica-
tion of a set of rules by which nodes are absorbed and branches
are combined to form new branches having different gains (i.e.,
different transition probabilities). By repeatedly applying
the reduction rules, a complex flow graph will be reduced to
one having the degree of complexity desired. If a graph is
completely reduced, the result is a residual graph in which
one input node is connected to a selected output node by a
single link. Thus, graph reduction can be viewed as a way
of solving sets of linear equations.
The technique of reducing graphs is generally applicable
only in the case of flow graphs where a limited number of
output nodes (i.e., probabilities of state occupations) are of
interest. During the reduction process, some of the nodes are
necessarily absorbed and thereby lose their identity. This is
a serious handicap in applications where the preservation of
intermediate node is of importance. Overcoming this handicap
requires that the graph be repeatedly reduced, preserving a set
of selected nodes each time.
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In flow graph language, the value of an unknown in a
linear system can be expressed as:
n
xi = Z (T )(input). (2.28)
j=1 j-J-i
Where Xi is the ith output, n is the number of input, and
Tj- i is the transmittance from input node j to output node i.
The quantity, Tj i can be thought of as the ratio of
T = contribution of input j to output i (2.29)
input j
An ingenious technique for evaluating the transmittance T
from a specified input node to an output node in a graph based
on the formulation represented by equation (2.27) was devised
by Mason (1957). The technique is commonly referred to as
Mason's rules or "The 'Gee Whiz' Flow Graph Reduction Tech-
nique" and is expressed as:
T ( Z PkAk)/A (2.30)
all k
The summation in the above equation is over all of the paths
leading from an input node to an output node. The quantities
Pk and Ak are associated with the kth Path. The quantity A
has a value equal to the value of the determinant of the system
of equations (2.26).
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The following steps are usually useful in finding the
transmittance T:
(i) Identify "Simple Loop". A Simple Loop
is a closed cycle in the graph which has no
proper sub-cycle (touches no node more than
once).
(ii) Evaluate "Loop Products of Simple Loops!'. The
loop,product of a simple loop is the negative
product of the transmission of arcs of the loop.
(iii) Identify "Multiple Loops". A multiple Loop is
any combination of simple loops that have no
nodes in common.
(iv) Evaluate loop products of multiple loops. The
loop product of a multiple loop is the product
of the loop products of its simple loops.
(v) Calculate A = 1+ sum of all loop products.
(vi) Identify all "paths". A path is a directed set
of connected arcs with no cycle from input to the
output node.
(vii) Calculate Pk' the product of the arc transmission
for each path k.
(viii) Calculate Ak = 1 + sum of the loop products of all
loops sharing no node with path k for every path.
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(ix) Find transmittance T from Eqno (2.30).
To clarify the above procedure, we present the following
example. Let us assume we want to find the transmittance
T
1+3
of the following figure:
a
1 1
Here we refer to the
e
steps as we proceed to find T
1+3
(i) Simple loops are, 2-2, 1-3-1, 1-2-3-1.
(ii) With loop products of -e, -ab, -cbd
respectively.
(iii) The only multiple loop consists of 2-2 and
1-3-1.
(iv) With loop product of eab, then
(v) A = l-e-ab-cdb+eab
(vi) The paths from 1 to 3 are: 1-3 and 1-2-3
(vii) With P1 = al, P2 = cd respectively
(viii) Then we calculate A1 = 1-3, and A2 = 1 to find
(ix) T
1+3
, a(l-e) + cd
1-e-ab -cdb+eab
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Having discussed Mason's rule in flow graph reduction,
we can relate Eqn. (2.25) to a flow graph. Equation (2.25)
has a flow graph interpretation. In order to make it more
realizable, let us rewrite Eqn. (2.25b) in the following
form:
D(s)[CcW(s)]-l [I -Po H(S)] = I (2.31)
Then we can write
N 0
ik
cc [6kj - Pkj hkj()] = 6ij l<i,jnk=l wk k
and by proper rearrangement we get
p i() =N ik(s)
ccwis) j k=l k(j (s) (2.32)
for fixed i, the above equation defines N linear equations
with N unknowns. If we interpret ij(s)/CCwj(s) as the signal
at node j and assign transmission Pij hij(s) to the arc from
node i to node j, then ij (s) is the product of CCwj(s) and
effective transmission node i to node j, see Fig. 26a.
Figure 2.6b shows the partial flow graph for fixed i, as we
can see for each node j we have an output tap with transmission
Ccwj(s). Finally it is worth mentioning that ij(s)/cwj(s)
J j
and T have the same definition (.See Section 3.3.1).
i-+j
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(s) =
CCw(s)1
= [I - PoH(s)]- CCW(s)
PvH(s)
a. Matrix flow graph for the continuous
time Semi-Markov process.
Pik hik(s)
ccwi
Wi
Pij hij (s)
T 1J '** -
b. Partial flow graph for the continuous
time Semi-Markov process.
Fig. 2.6: Flow graph representation for the
continuous time Semi-Markovian process.
ik (s )
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2.4 Reliability Model of Periodically Maintained Systems
In Section 2.1, we discussed that one way to enhance the
reliability (availability) of a system is to increase its
redundancy. Stand-by systems are another form of redundancy.
They are often added to a system of critical importance so as
to ensure the safe operation of the main plant. For example,
such stand-by systems are widely used in the reactors as
emergency safety systems. These systems are rarely called
upon to operate, but their availabilities are critical. There-
fore, each system is monitored periodically in order to
maximize its availability.
This class of systems cannot be analyzed by any of the
previously discussed models because the failure cannot be
detected when it actually occurs and because repair is not
performed in a random manner; however, repair is allowed when
the failure is detected. Vesely and Goldberg (1977), and
Caldarola (1977) have developed two different techniques for
handling this class of components. Caldarola assumes that a
component undergoing periodic testing is repaired in a constant
interval and becomes as good as new, while Vesely and Goldberg
use the same repair policy, but they do not strictly enforce
the 'as good as new' model after repair. In this study a
generalized formulation is developed that accommodates dif-
ferent repair policies.
Figure 2.7 shows a typical time dependent unreliability of
a periodically tested component with a constant repair time of
A
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TR
.
As we can see, the test interval is divided into three
periods:
1) test period duration, Tc (hours),
tn t t n * Tc
2) repair period duration, TR (hours),
tn + Tc < t < t + Tc TR
3) between the test (stand-by) period duration,
T2 - Tc - TR (hours),
tn + Tc + TR t tn+l
In order to predict the unreliability of a periodically
tested component one has to account for the following contri-
butions:
A) Test period contribution
The system may be unavailable during the inspection
period for either of the following causes:
1) The system is unable to override the test with
probability q should an emergency signal require
its operation.
2) System has failed before the test with proba-
bility Q.
Therefore, the unreliability contribution during this
period will be;
R(t) = Q + (1- Q)qo; tn<t<tn+Tc
n- - +c
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where
Q R(t)
(2.33)
t = tn
B) Repair and between the test (stand-by) period contri-
butions, tn+Tc <t<tn+l
Since we are interested in a general repair policy,
we cannot differentiate between the repair and stand-
by period contributions as we did for our typical
example. Here, we consider a general repair time
distribution function, g(t), for the repair policy.
The system is unavailable at time t after the test
if:
1) The system was up at time 0 (at the end of test
time) and it failed at t randomly according to
failure time density function f(t), or
2) The system was down at time 0 and repaired with
the following possibilities:
a) it is still under repair = 1- G(t)
b) it was repaired at time T, (0<T<t), but
failed again at t with probability =
to G(-) f(t -)dT
NOTE: in part b) we assume the system will be
repaired once per interval.
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Therefore we can write:
R(t) = aF(t) + [1 - G(t) + G(T)f(t-T)dT] (2.34)
Where
a = the probability that the system was up after
the test (reference time: t = 0)
= 1 - a = the probability that system is down
at time zero
F(t) = f(t)dt
G(t) = g(t)dt
In the above equation is the sum of two different pro-
babilities that have happened prior to the start of this cycle.
In other words, if the above equation is written for the time
interval tn to tn+l, the value of is related to the unreli-
ability outcome of tn-l to tn
.
Hence, for generalizing the
Eqn. (2.34) we start at the first test interval t = t1 where
the unreliability is:
Rl(t) = F(t)
and
Q1 R 1 (t) F(tl) = F1 (2.35)
t = tI
The system will be down after the first test with probability
B1 because either it has failed during the test or failed
prior to test. Therefore:
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(2.35a)
1 = Pf + (1 - Pf)Q 1 = Pf + PfQ 1
where:
Pf = probability that the test caused the failure.
Consequently, by writing the successive Qi and .i we can write
Q = (1 - 1 )F + 1 J2 c G(T)f(t - T)dT
Q2 = (1 - B!)F + B
(2.35b)+ 61[ - G(T2 - T)]
However, the third term of the above equation is almost
zero because T2, in practical cases, is much larger than the
average repair time, and if we replace the integral term by
Y we have:
Q2 = (1 - 1)F + Y
Substituting for 81 from Eqn. (2.35a), and rearranging
the above equation, we get:
(2.35c)Q2 = X - Q1[X - PfY] + PfY
82 = Pf + PfQ 2
Q3 = - xIX - fY] + Q[X - fy]
* 9 9
.S
* s0
QN (X + PfY)
- PfY[X - PfY] + PfY
1 N-1 pyN-l
- C-1 I - P fY]
1 + X -Y
+ (.-1 )N Q [X - pfy]N-1 (2.36)
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(2.36a)BN = Pf + PfQN
Where:
F = F(t)I
t = T2 T c
X = fF
N = number of cycle
The general unreliability equation for time interval tn
to t is:
n+ 
%(t) (1 -i s,.1 )F(t) + 1 - G(t) + G (T)f(ft - )dT]
0 < t < T
_ - 2 (2.37)
Usually the quantity, [X - PfY] is very small and the
value of QN quickly reaches its asymptotic value which is
given by:
X + PfY
1 + X - fY
The asymptotic unreliability equation will then read:
X + PY
R (t) F(t) + [ +fY
1f  -fYf
I[1 - G(t) - F(t) + f G(T)f(t - T)dT]
0 < t < T2 - Tc (2.39)
Q. (2.38)
+ Pf]
- Tc
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To show the applicability of the above equation, we give
the following examples and compare the results with Vesely
et al. (1977) and Caldarola (1977) for constant repair and
exponential failure distributions.
First, let us show the above referenced equations (for
detailed information see the references):
a) Vesely et al. (1977). For the case where
Pf = 0 and q = 1
1) R(t) = (t - Tc) TR + Tc < t < T2 (2.40)
2) R(t) - x(T2 -Tc) + (1 - (T2 - TC))1 XTR
Tc < t < TR + Tc (2.41)
3) R(t) 1 0 < t < Tc
b) Caldarola (1977).
1) R(t) = l(t) - l(t - Tc) + F(t - Tc)
F(T2 - T)
1 + F(T2 - Tc) - F(T2 - Tc - TR)
[l(t - Tc) - l(t - Tc - TR) - F(t - T )
+ F(t - Tc - TR)]
< t < T2 (2.42)
2) Approximated equation used in PL-MODT (Modarres
(1979)). (2.43)
R (t)t) - 1 - exp(- [1 [- () ]]
t approx eff P c
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where
T2 T T 2 - Tc
2 2
2T T r( - )+ R + 2(1 - )
q = n( - n(XTc))
.r(·) = Gamma function
The significance of q is: it must be large enough to
cause k(t)lapprox
Iapp rox
to become:.
. (t)approx = 1 - exp(- efft) for t > Tc
Now, let us find our equation for constant repair and
exponential failure distribution.
G(t) = |
t < TR
t > T R
f(t) = Ae t, A is failure rate.
For consistency with the Eqn. (2.42), we change the
reference time in Eqn. (2.39) to the start of the cycle:
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R (t - T) = (1 - )F(t - T) + [1 - G(t - Tc)
+ ft 'Tc G(T)f(t - T
0
- T)dT] (2.44)
By replacing G(.), ,, and taking into account that
Pf = 0 and
Y = G(T)f(t - Tc - )dT
f0t-Tc
_fToT f(t - ')dt' = F(T 2 - Tc - TR)
where T' = Tc + T
Equation (2.44) will read:
R.(t - Tc) = F(t - Tc) + F(T - T )
1 + F(T2 - Tc) - F(T 2 - Tc - TR)
[1 - G(t - Tc) - F(t - Tc) + F(t - Tc - TR)]
(2.45)
In the cases where [F(T2 - Tc) - F(T 2 - Tc - TR)] is small
we can find an approximate formulation from the above
equation for t in the intervals of [Tc, T + TR] and
fTc + TR' T2], where TR is average repair time.
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For Tc < t< T + TR we can write:
-t)lapprox = F(t - Tc) + F(T2 - Tc)[1 - F(t - T)]
(2.46)
Because G(t - TR), F(t - Tc - TR) are both zero when their
arguments are less than or equal to zero, then we can find the
average unreliability over TR.
1= - ( 2 T)) (t)dt
= T-[ ( - F(T2 - Tc)) F(t)dtR~ fI avg
JTR
fO F(T2 - TC)dt]
Replacing for F(.) and approximating the exponential term
(i.e., e = 1 -
fi = [1lavg
x2
x + A- where x < 0.01) we get
- F(T2 - Tc)]½ ATR + F(T2 - Tc) (2.47)
For Tc + TR < t < T2 we can write:
R (t) ap F(t - Tc) + F(T2 - Tc)[F(t - Tc - TR)
- F(t - T)] (2.48)
But since we assumed that the second term is small
compared to the first term, because the bracket term is very
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small, Eqn. (2.41) will be reduced to:
R(t) = F(t - T) TR + Tc < t < T2 (2.49)
approx
The application of Eqns. (2.39 to 2.43), (2.45), (2.47)
and (2.49) to a typical system with A = 10 3/hr, TR = 21 hrs.,
T 2 = 720 hrs., Tc - 1.5 hrs. is shown in Table 2.1 and
Fig. 2.8. As we can see, Caldarola's first equation and
Eqn. (2.45) of this study give exactly the same results (they
are basically identical equations). Our approximated equations,
i.e., Eqns. (2.47), (2.49) predict very well in comparison. to the
exact results (compare columns 4 and 5). Bath the equations
used in PL-MODT (cf. Eqn. (2.43)) underestimate the unreli-
ability during the repair and overestimate at the end of the
interval. Vesely's equations overestimate conservatively
everywhere because of the nature of the approximation used in
the formulation. In fact, if one keeps the exponential terms
instead of its first two terms approximation in Vesely's model,
one will get the same equation as we obtained by approximating
our general equation (cf. Eqns. (2.47), (2.49)). We should
mention that the approximation is only true if [F(T2 - Tc) -
F(T 2 - Tc - TR)] 1.
In another example, we consider the following repair
distributions:
1) exponential with -= , TR - 21 hrs.
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equations developed in this study and those of Vesely's
and Caldarola's for a periodically tested component.
1.C
.g
I
4
4
310 -
8
14 7
6H
<43
10-1
9
.8
7
6
4
Fig. 2.8:
76
Ul L' '0 , \'0 O 
; I lt ot t t o oLn Lo o n o o
, H o H0 00 0o o oo o 0
I) . (( (_ (N C) 0 0 -q o o0 0n i n
............. C........ C, C .. ...
-I) * *'I n O O *- 0r ) ') 
. O O O O  O q O O O
~,m C C O c ·N O O O O 0 00 0 - 0 0 0H -1 t) - #9 o) 0 N- oot o ur*d r- '0 '0 '0 N 00 0 ' Mt t -*N - n ,- ,- N- ot o 0 d0 (-I 
>- U') ¢o * * * e o * * o o o o
C+ +- CA : O O O O O 0 O 0 O O O
H C C
00
: Ln N 0 t8 ) 0(NM I fH 0 a) oo t 0o i) N ) 0t )
.4 'O N O O 0 O 
cNI( H 1 N 0) O O N d t N c)
vcR rl \ s b H C) m ql 10 n sX 0 C) C) C- 00 N - O t 0 0
(1) C) LI) L) C) LI) 0 0 vC I #) ) C LC) N
UJ O O O O 0 O O O O O
' N N O # O N Ct ) oo 0 t 00 LC N N- c. O "
.g ) \0 N O 0 00 : C C) C 0N) r- , N c N L) o o N dt N L)
*X 0 -1 v- v- 00 N- N dw O 0)
;W L) 00 0 0 O O v ) dt 00 N
* 
.0 o * 0 o o 0 * * 0
O O O O ONO O O O O C O
r 00 rI v- ) #) 0 0 M 00 - N.
Q, k e v, o o0 0 0 o 0 0 0 ( 
r P. 0 rj 00 N N O O o 0 o N c
v-I N N '0 o 3 
O4
O00 UZ:
OH
n _
r.
4 H
n~ 
O. H
77
2) 2nd order Erlangian _ 2 , TR2 21 hrs,TR 21 hrs.,
R
3) lognormal with p = Ln(TR), 0.5, T R = 21 hrs.
Table 2.2 summarizes the unreliability results by
utilizing Eqn. (2.45). None of the above references are
able to predict the unreliabilities for these distributions.
Therefore, a comparison was not possible. However, a comparison
of the aforementioned distributions with their given properties
shows a small difference in unreliability outcome for this
typical example, which signifies that we can interchange dis-
tributions as long as we maintain their mean values nearly
identical.
In the above example, both exponential and 2nd order
Erlangian distribution have the same mean, i.e., TR = 21,
and the lognormal has a median of 21 hours. In view of the
complexity of Eqn. (2.45) for the above distributions, the
exponential distribution is a good candidate for repair, ie.,
it is simple.and gives conservative values (see Fig. 2.9). For
detailed equations used in the analysis of Table 2.2, see
Appendix A.1.
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--- 2nd order Erlangian
--- Log-normal
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Fig. 2.9: Comparison of the application of
Eqn. (2.45) to the different
repair distributions.
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CHAPTER 3: PRINCIPLE STRUCTURE OF THE CODE UNRAC
3.1 Introduction
The knowledge of the availability of the emergency
safety features in a reactor is of major importance in
assessing reactor safety. One method which has been used
successfully in the past and is being reiterated in the wake
of Three Mile Island is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). Most
vendors and utilities have been instructed by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to evaluate the availability of
their emergency systems to ensure a safe condition of the
reactor should an accident occur. Because of the complexity
of the system, one has to have a tool (generally a computer
code), to predict the availability of the system. To do so,
there exist several codes (cf. Chapter 1), but each has its
own restrictions and usually one requires two or more codes
to do a complete job. Therefore, one has to be familiar with
three or more codes in order to adequately predict the
required system availability. In such cases, the probability
of making errors in data preparation will increase greatly
and the job will become cumbersome. Hence, there is an
incentive to develop a code which is comparatively easy to
use and, in addition, can accommodate the complete job in one
step. In this study, we develop a computer package which does
the following:
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1) generates the minimal cut sets;
2) finds the importance of each basic component rela-
tive to system failure;
3) evaluates the point estimate, time dependent and
average unavailability and/or unreliability of the
system under study; and
4) simulates the top event distribution by Monte-Carlo
and finds the approximate distribution which
represents the top event by the method of moment
matching.
The package can be used for carrying out any of the above
analyses individually or totally. To discuss the basic prin-
ciple of the code, we divide the package into three sections:
a) Cut set generator
This part of the code generates the cut sets and
finds the minimal cut sets which are essential for
evaluating the top event unavailability.
b) Time dependent unavailability evaluator
This part of the code calculates basic component
unavailability depending upon the nature of the
components (maintained or non-maintained) and
parameters (failure and repair rates) involved.
c) Monte-Carlo simulator
This part of the code simulates each component's
distribution in order to find the top events
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distribution and to determine the uncertainty in the
evaluation of top event from the given spread of the
component's parameters
3.2 Cut Set Generator
3.2.1 Introduction
The first step in FTA is to find the minimal cut sets.
In the past decade, several codes have been developed by
different researchers. The most popular among these are PREP,
by Vesely and Narum (1970), MOCUS by Fussel et al. (1974),
TREEL-MICSUP by Pande et al. (1975), SETS by Worrel (1975),
and WAM-CUT by Erdmann et al. (1978). The above selection is
a good example of the versatility of the techniques which have
been used to generate the minimal cut sets. PREP is the first
code in this series. Because of the inherent limitations of
the PREP code, MOCUS was written to replace it. MOCUS uses
a top down algorithm. The algorithm starts from the Top event
of the fault tree and moves, by successive substitution of the
gate equations, down the tree until only basic events remain
in the list of possible Top-event failure modes(i.e. cut sets).
In another study it has been found that by proper storage and
restructure of the fault tree, one can decrease both the stor-
age and time necessary to find the cut set relative to MOCUS
(Chatterjee (1974)). TREEL-MICSUP is based on the above
finding and the algorithm used in this code is a bottom up one.
In this code, the tree will be restructured first and then the code
starts to find the cut set and respective minimal cut sets.
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In SETS, Set Equation Transformation System, the code symbol-
ically manipulates Boolean equations formed by a set of events
operated on by a particular set of union, intersection and
complement operators. Here the fault tree should be input as
a Boolean equation to represent each event as a function of
its input events.
A Boolean equation is a mathematical representation of a
gate, i.e., for two components inputted to an AND or an OR
gate one has to write:
C = A + B for OR gate
C = A * B for AND gate
C = is the output signal
The last code mentioned above, WAM-CUT, uses the TREEL-
MICSUP algorithm. First the code restructures the fault tree
so that each gate can only accept two inputs. The restruc-
tured tree will be stored from low level gates -- gates with
components input only -- to high level gates and finally top
event. Second, the code uses binary representation of basic
components, i.e., 1 for failed state and 0 for unfailed state
of the component, to be able to store each component in the
cut set by a bit of the word which represents the cut set.
By this method, one can store as many as 63 components in a
cut set word length in CDC 7600 or 31 components in IBM 370/168
as compared to 63 or 31 word lengths needed to store in MOCUS
or MISCUP.
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All the above mentioned codes are written for large trees
and the initial storage required for each code is prohibitive,
i.e., WAM-CUT needs 1440K-byte storage for any job of up to
1500 components and/or gates. Rosenthal (1975) pointed out
that in general we cannot hope to find a "fast" algorithm for
arbitrary fault trees, and the only hope for analyzing large
trees is through the application of tree decomposition methods.
Therefore, there is an incentive to look for an algorithm
which requires less storage and which is comparatively fast to
analyze the large decomposed trees. In addition, it should be
able to couple the code with others without hampering the code
performance and exceeding certain storage limits. For quali-
tative and quantitative analysis, one needs the top event
minimal cut sets only, therefore one should be careful not to
sacrifice storage and efficiency in order to get more capabil-
ities out of a given code.
3.2.2 Cut Set Generator Used in UNRAC
To generate the minimal cut set from a given fault tree,
we chose BIT and modified it to suit our needs in this study.
BIT is a portion of an unpublished work by Dr. Wolf (1975) in
which one could only use a fault tree with a limited number of
components and/or gates. After a series of modifications and
improvements, the BIT code was benchmarked against MODCUT
(Modarres 1979) and WAM-CUT (EPRI-1978) to check its accuracy
and efficiency. The reason for choosing these two codes was
that both use binary representation of the components to
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generate the minimal cut sets. However, MODCUT is written
in the PL/1 computer language whereas WAM-CUT and BIT are in
FORTRAN IV.
The BIT code uses a top down algorithm. It generates the cut
sets by successive replacement of the gates through the fault
tree logic by their respective inputs. BIT is written in such
a way that the user could easily follow the steps in the code
and, to prevent confusion, the major steps in the code have
been separated from the main routine by proper subroutines.
Figure 3.1 shows the flow chart and steps used in the BIT.
Since cut set generation is a time consuming process, a
discrimination procedure which eliminates cut set of given
size has been encoded to accelerate the computation when
quantitative evaluation is a desired goal and the component
unavailabilities are small. The discrimination process is at
its best when one uses a top down algorithm. Otherwise, one
has to find all the intermediate cut sets before one is able
to discriminate them. In order to see how the discriminatory
process is important for some fault tree see Fig. 3.2 (EPRI
(1975)).
BIT is also capable of handling both complement and basic
events. Therefore, it allows the user to have NAND, NOR, NOT
and Exclusive OR (EOR) gates in his fault tree. However, by
proper transformation of special gates, such as NAND, NOR and
EOR, one can easily end up with the basic logics, i.e., AND,
OR and NOT gates. Fig. 3.3 shows such transformation.
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Fig. 3.1: Flow chart and steps used in cut set
generator BIT.
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Fig. 3.1: continued.
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find minimal cut sets, (EPRI (1975))
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Fig. 3.3: Equivalent transformation of EOR, NAND,
NOR, and NOT gates
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To clarify the BIT algorithm described above, we do the
following example. Figure 3.4 shows an electrical circuit which
was originally used by Fussell (1973) and has been used by
several authors by including and/or excluding different parts
from it to show their methods of generating cut sets (prime
implicant), i.e., see Bennett (1975) and Henley Kumamoto
1978). Figure 3.5 shows the transformed fault tree after
replacing EOR by basic gates and combining some of the suc-
cessive gates given in Bennett (1975). By proper initializa-
tion of components and gate, we have a total of 9 components
and 11 gates.
BIT starts by initializing each component and/or gate
uniquely by storing 1 in a bit of the word related to the
component and/or gate number, i.e., component I will be stored
as:
ME (I) = 2**(I-1) I< 31
for I 1
ME(1) - (0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001)2
or to show it more compactly
ME(1) = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 oool = B'l'
and for I = 20
ME(20) = 0 0 0 looo 0 0 0 0 = B'20'
B'.' = represents bit occupation No. of the word (The
rest of bits are zero)
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POWER
SUPPLY 1
POWER
SUPPLY 2
SWITCH
TOP EVENT
PRIMARY FAILURES
Z: No light
A: Bulb failure
B: Power supply 1 failure
C: Relay contacts stuck open
D : Circuit breaker stuck open
E: Switch stuck open
F :Switch stuck closed
G: Power supply 2 failure
H : Relay toil open circuits
I: Circuit breaker coil open circuits
INITIAL CONDITIONS: Switch closed, relay contacts closed, circuit
breaker contacts open.
CIRCUIT ACTION: If relay contacts open, an operator opens the
switch causing the contact breaker to close
thereby restoring power to the bulb.
NOT-ALLOWED EVENTS: Operator failure, wiring failure, secondary failure.
Fig. 3.4: Detailed information of operation and
failure modes of an electrical wiring
system (Bennett (1975)).
LIGHT
BULB
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-8 -9 5 7 8 9
Fig. 3.5: Compact fault tree of the electrical
wiring system.
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In the top down algorithm we start by reading in the
fault tree from the top event and for each input to the OR
gate we increase the number of cut sets. Each cut set in the
code consists of two parts: the positive part which stores
all the basic events and gates and the negative parts in which
we only store the complements of the events called KM and MK
array in the code respectively. Since there are only 31
available bits in a word (IBM 370/168), we have to combine
a series of word lengths to get the desired components and/or
gates capability in the code. Here we use only 1 word length
because the total number of components and gates is twenty.
The top gate is an OR gate, gate 10. Therefore, we have
two cut sets:
KM(l) = B'll' MK(1) = 0
KM(2) = B'1' MK(2) = 0
Cut set No. 2 is a component No. 1, but cut set No. 1 is
gate 11. Therefore, we replace gate 11 in cut set 1 by gate
12 and 19.
KM(1) = B'12,19' MK(1) = 0
Gate 12 is an OR gate therefore, we increase the number
of cut sets
KM(1) = B'2,19' MK(l) = 0
KM(3) = B'3,19' MK(3) = 0
KM(4) = B'13,19' MK(4) = 0
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In cut set 1 we have gate 19 which is an OR gate,
replacing it by its input we have:
KM(1) = B'2,20' MK(1) = 0
KM(5) = B'2' MK(5) = 0
KM(6) = B'2,4' MK(6) = 0
We continue the replacement procedure until there is no
gate in the cut set.
KM(1) = B'2,6,14' MK(1) = 0
KM(1) = B'2,6,15,16' MK(1) = 0
KM(1) = B'2,6,16' MK(1) = 0
DI(7) = B'2,6,16,18' MK(6) = 0
KI (1) = B'2,6' MK(1) = B'6'
KD(8) = B'2,6,17' MK(8) = 0
At this stage, since the positive part of cut set number
1 is composed of basic events only, the code first combines
the two parts of the cut set to nullify the cut sets which
contain both complement and basic event of a component (i.e.,
A. = 0), see Appendix B.1. In this example, combination of
KM and MK results in:
(KM,MK) = B'2,6, 6' = 0
The above process is executed in Subroutine MCSN1. Sub-
routine MCSN1 is also used to compare the new cut sets with
the previously generated cut sets to check if it is an identi-
cal or super set. If it is neither, then the code calls
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Subroutine MCSN2 to check for the existence of any super sets
corresponding to new cut set. If so, it should be nullified.
The basic logic used in these two subroutines is the combina-
tion of AND and OR logic, i.e., if CS1 and CS2 are the two
cut sets to be compared and CS! is the new one, then we have
the following cases:
a) IF (IAND(CSl,CS2).EQ.CS2) (Subroutine MCSN1)
CS1 is either identical or a super set to CS2
b) IF(IAND(CSl,CS2).EQ.CS1) (Subroutine MCSN2)
CS2 is a super set of CS1
In case a), CS1 will be nullified whereas in case b),
CS2 will be nullified.
After the comparison and elimination process, the code
will start the substitution process by replacing the last cut
set number for the one just eliminated. Here, cut set No. 8
will replace cut set No. 1 and the code will continue by
substituting for gate 17.
KM(1) = B'2,6,5' MK(1) = 0
The new cut set No. 8 is:
KM(8) = B'2,6,71 MK(8) = 0
KM(9) = B'2,6,8' MK(9) = 0
KM(10) = B'2,6,9' MK(10) = 0
Again cut set No. 1 is a gate free cut set. Therefore,
subroutine MCSN1 will be called. Since there exists cut set
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No. 5 which has component No. 2, cut set No. 1, which is a
super set of No. 5, will be replaced by cut set 10 and the
process will continue. In fact, all the previously found
cut sets which have component No. 2 in them will be cancelled.
This elimination and substitution will continue until the
code has swept completely through the fault tree and found all
the minimal cut sets. The final results for this example are
shown in Table 3.1.
The example in Table 3.1 was checked against the results
of Bennett (1975) and Henley Kumamoto (1978). It took BIT
a fraction of second to generate all the cut sets (i.e., 0.07
sec.).
In another example, the code was checked against MODCUT.
The fault tree used is shown in Appendix B.2. It generates
the 86 cut sets in 0.84 seconds compared to MODCUT which
takes 9.8 seconds.
In the third example, the code was checked against
WAM-CUT. Here we do not have any processing time for WAM-CUT.
The BIT code generates all the minimal cut sets in 0.35
seconds. The fault tree and the respective minimal cut sets
are shown in Appendix B,.2.
As we discussed earlier, cut set generation is a lengthy
process and in order to shorten it one has to be familiar with
the tree and be able to reduce it as much as possible. There
are many methods that can be used to reduce the fault tree:
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Table 3.1: MINIMAL CUT SET GENERATED BY BIT
FOR THE EXAMPLE FAULT TREE
Components in the Cut Set
Name
A
B
CD
No.
1
2
3,4
DEF
DFG
DFH
DFI
CEF-HI
4,-6,8
4,6,9
3, , 6 7,,'
Cut Set No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
-
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1) Combine the successive gates as much as possible.
However, this can only be done if the successive
gates have the same type of gate.
2) Break down the large tree to small non-repetitive
sub trees.
3) Combine some of the components inputted into a gate
or different gates and represent them as a special
component. This method is very useful in quantita-
tive analysis. To determine the properties of a
special component in terms of individual component
properties, see Appendix B.3.
3.3 Unavailabilty Evaluator
3.3.1 Introduction
Quantitative evaluation of system reliability is con-
cerned with synthesizing reliability characteristics for the
TOP event from basic component reliability characteristics.
Most published methods for quantitative evaluation require
minimal cut sets as input to represent the system model.
Component failures represented in a logic model, i.e.,
fault tree or event tree, can either be statistically dependent
or statistically independent. Conventional reliability analy-
sis methods assume that component failures are statistically
independent. However, dependencies can be easily modeled in
the logic diagram so that the events in the final minimal cut
sets are statistically independent, see Gokcek et al. (1979),
Elerath Ingram (1979), EPRI 217-2-2 (1975). One of the
methods which can be used to model the dependencies is the
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Markovian model. By this method, one can easily separate
the dependent logic and show the combined system as a non-
dependent event in the fault tree. But, one should bear in
mind that the above model sometimes requires the use of a
computer program for solving linear differential equations.
In certain cases, the method discussed in Chapter 2 might
be helpful in finding the system reliability function.
Another method for handling dependent events requires
redrawing the fault tree. Suppose one wants to model the
dependent event B in which the probability of event B is
dependent on the occurrence of event A. Then one way to
show the dependency is to use the building block shown in
Fig. 3.6.
As it is shown in Appendix B.1, the event space in Fig.
3.6 represents the logical expression:
B (AnB/A) U (AflB/A)
Where:
B/A = Event B given the occurrence of A
And
B/A = Event B given the occurrence of A
The above identity holds since, if we assume
C = (AnB/A) (ACB/A) Then
C = (AnB)U'(An B) from the definition of events
B/A B/A
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Fig. 3.6: Fault tree showing a dependence
of B on the occurrence of A.
.:
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Thus:
C = Bn(AUA) = B
When applying this model to large fault trees, it must
be recognized that the dependent event building block is
irreducible.
Figure 3.6 could be extended to model common mode failure.
For example, the interaction of a number of components to a
common mode initiator (such as flooding or fire) can be
described by incorporating a dependent event building block
for each component. Figure 3.7 shows a model for describing
the top event B of a system in which the common mode initiator
event A is specified.
Knowing this, we can model our logic diagram i.e., fault
tree, such that each basic event represents an independent
event and we can develop certain mathematical models that will
allow us to predict individual basic event unreliability and/
or unavailability. Finally, by using the minimal cut set we
can calculate the top event unreliability and/or unavail-
ability.
The first comprehensive unreliability analysis of
emergency safety features was performed in WASH 1400 (1975).
In that study most of event occurrences were assumed to be
constant. But, since most of emergency safety features are
redundant systems and they are periodically tested to insure
their readiness, one has to make a time dependent unreliability
analysis to be able to predict the system unavailability more
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Fig. 3.7: Dependent event conncecting fault tree.
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realistically. In today's quantitative codes only KITT 1 2
(Vesely et al. (1970)), PL-MODT (Modarres (1979)) and FRANTIC
(Vesely and Goldberg (1977)) are time dependent evaluators.
KITT 1 uses exponential failure and repair distributions with
constant parameters but is unable to analyze the periodically
tested components. KITT 2 is the same as KITT 1 except that
it has the capability of accommodating step wise time depen-
dent repair and failure rates. FRANTIC is an approximated
KITT code with the capability of handling periodically tested
components. The above codes are written in FORTRAN IV. PL-
MODT is a PL/1 code which uses modular techniques and has the
same capability as the FRANTIC code. All the above codes
have prespecified failure and repair distributions, and most
of the time the distributions for the system being analyzed
are not the same as those which have been coded. Also, some
systems require more rigorous evaluation because of the exis-
tence of different types of failures and paths that the system
may undergo during its change of state. For example, consider
a pump. A pump can be in one of the following states at any
given time:
1) up state (working or stand-by)
2) under the test
3) under repair
Because of certain mechanical difficulties or economical
reasons not all the possible failure models can be immediately
detected upon the failure, (i.e., it is impossible to allocate
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a detector for crank shaft failure or it is uneconomical to
install detectors for all the ancillaries). Therefore, there
is a chance that the pump must go under the test in order to
find its malfunction, or there is a chance with probability
P1 that the pump can be started by resetting its control
panel. Figure 3.8 shows all the possible paths that the pump
may undergo during its change of state.
3.3.2 Unavailability Evaluator Used in UNRAC
For our unavailability evaluator we used the models
discussed in Chapter 2 for the maintained and non-maintained
systems (components). For the maintained system, we consider
a variety of distributions as a candidate for repair distribu-
tion and they are:
1) exponential
2) constant
3) Erlangian (special Gamma)
4) log normal (approximated by combination of
exponentials)
The related reliability equation for a two-state system with
exponential or constant distribution has been discussed
earlier (cf. Eqns. 2.12 and 2.18).
In the case of periodically maintained components, the
general equation developed in Chapter 2 (cf. Eqn. 2.38) has
been used with the following repair distribution capabilities:
1) constant
2) exponential
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P4
UP REPAIR
TEST
Fig. 3.8: All possible paths of a pump failure.
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3) Erlangian
For the detailed equations see Appendix A.1.
To be able to analyze a 3 state component, see Fig. 3.8,
we model the component as a semi-Markovian process. Figure
3.9 shows a detailed 3 state system with all the respective
holding time distributions. Using the method discussed in
Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, we can show that the probability
that the system will remain in state 1 at time t given that
it was at state 1 at time zero have the following Laplace
transforms:
1- F(s) (3.1)
f11(s)- s[l-P4F*(s) G*(s)-P3F*(s) PP1 3F (s) P2T*(s) G*(s)
The above equation can be easily transformed to equation
(2.16) by putting P3=0 and P4=1. Therefore, we used this
equation as a general equation for the monitored system
(component). The application of equation (3.1) to the afore-
mentioned repair distributions are:
1) If we assume repair and test distribution to be
exponential then we have
G*(2) = 
T*(s) V (3.2)V+s
F*(s) = X
where , p, v, are failure, repair, test completion
rates and they are assumed to be constant. Hence, by
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P4,F(t)
REPAIRUP
P3 ,F ,(t)
TEST
Fig. 3.9: A general three-state component.
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substituting for G*(s), F*(s) and T*(s) in Eqn. (3.1)
we get:
11 (s) = (P + s) (v + s)
s[s 2 + as + b] (3.3)
where
a X= + v+ p- P1P3X
b = v + v + P3X - P1P3(v + p)
Inversion of Eqn. (3.3) to the" t domain results
in a series of equations which are given in Appendix
A.2. The asymptotic value of 11(t) can be easily
shown by applying final value theorem:
Hence
¢11(X = lim 11(t) = lim [SO11(s)]
+l1 (X) - v
-- 5
(3.4)
(3.5)
2) If we
order
assume that the repair distribution is a 2nd
Erlangian then 11(s) will be:
011 () = ( + S)
2 (v+ s)
s[s3 + as2 + bs+ c]
(3.6)
where
a = + v+ 2- P1Ps
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b = 2(A + v) + P2 + vA - P1P 3 (2 + v)X
C = (v + A) 2 + 2v - P3PlX(2v + ) - P4Ai2
Again we only show the asymptotic value here and the
rest of the respective equations are given in
Appendix A.2.
- 1 1 ( ) (3.7)c
3) If we assume the repair distribution to be lognormal,
we can approximately match it with a combination of
exponential distributions, i.e. we can assume the
repair distribution, g(t), to have the following
form:
g(t) = A[eXt e-X2 t] (3.8)
where
2 X1
A by normalization is equal to X A
1X 2
and G*(s) = (A+ s) + ) (3.9)
using the above equation for G*(s), the asymptotic
value for pll(t) will be:
v (3.10)
11 °°) - c (3.10)
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where
c = (v ) ) - PP(X + 2 + + A1A2)
- P4 A1A2 A
and the rest f the related equations are given in
Appendix A.2.
Since the cumulative repair probability distributions signi-
fies the completeness of the repair, we compare the lognormal
and its approximated (matched) combination of exponentials by
theircumulative distribution values. Figures 3.10-to 3.12
show the above comparison for two typical examples. As can
be seen, for a highly skewed lognormal (large a), the dif-
ference between the results is on the order of maximum 2%
(Figs. 3.10, 3.12). But for a small standard deviation
(small a), the lognormal repair distribution approaches 1
faster than its approximated distribution. Therefore, the
combination of exponentials produces reasonably accurate
(for largea.) and/or conservative (for small a) results. For
detailed values of Fig. 3.10 to 3.12 and for the method for
approximating lognormal, see Appendix A.2.
Having prepared the reliability equations for all the
possible types of components involved in a system, we need a
general system function to be able to evaluate the systems
reliability. As we mentioned earlier, most of the quantitative
codes use minimal cut sets as input to represent the system
model and the general system function given the minimal cut
lll
Time (hr)
Fig. 3.10: Comparison of cumulative probability distribution
of a log-normal with its approximated combination
of exponentials (median of 21 (hrs) and error
factor of 2.56)
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Fig. 3.12: Comparison of cumulative probability distribution
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sets has the following form:
N
QTop H (3.11)
where:
qj is the component unavailability or unreliability
j is the component number in s cut set
N is the total number of cut sets
J . is the union and by definition:
m mkY. = 1 -r(l-Yi); Yi is any function
Expanding Eqn. (3.11) in terms of cut set unavailability
i'Qci (Qcz = 7 qj) we get:
N N N
QTop 1i l QciQc. + 1 Q QClc. 11 i j &l13R
i<j i< j<t
N
+ (-1) ]iQci (3.12)
Evaluating the QTop for a medium size fault tree requires
a lot of computation time. Therefore, we approximate
Eqn.(3.12) by the method of inclusion-exclusion principle
discussed by Feller (1957) and Vesely (1970).
a) first term approximation, sometimes called rare-
event approximation
115
N
QTop -. QCi S1 (3.13)
b) first three terms approximation
QTop S -2 + (3.14)
c) first 5 terms approximation
QTop - 52 + 3 - 4 + 5 (3.15)
where
Si is the ith term in Eqn.(3.12).
The degree of approximation required to find the QTop is
usually dependent on the component unreliability and overall
size of cut sets involved. For low minimal cut set size, we
sometimes have to use a higher degree of approximation to get
a more accurate result. Occasionally, the following equation
is used to find the range of the top event unavailability.
1 - 2 < TQTop< (3.16)
To prepare our unavailability evaluator, we restructured
FRANTIC (Vesley and Goldberg (1977)) to incorporate our
models. We call the package UNReliability Analysis Code or
UNRAC. The code is organized in such a way that any user with
a limited knowledge of the computer can follow the code should
an alteration or modification be deemed necessary. Figure 3.13
shows the logical flow chart used in UNRAC. For more infor-
mation about the structure of the code see Appendix C.
UNRAC
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MCSN1
VTA T M-- rC)
LDECOD
- COMDAT
MONTOR- SOLN
- QCAUN
EXAGAM
- TIMES
SOLNT
- CIMPOR QCPONT - TEXGAM - QUNAV
L SYSCOM
SOLNT
- COMP QCPONT - TEXGAM - QUNAV
L SYSCOM
QAVERG
- QPRINT
- QPLOT -- - GRAPH - ENDPLT
- mr TM J XVART
_ MCSIM r
L-SYSCOM
Fig. 3.13: Logical flow chart used in UNRAC.
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In order to check the accuracy of the code we benchmarked
it against PREP and KITT and PL-MODT. Figure 3.14 shows a
sample fault tree and respective failure rates which appeared
in Vesely (1970) and Modarres (1979). Figure 3.15 shows the
results of this study with PREP and KITT, PL-MODT and BIT-
FRANTIC (Wolf and Karimi (1978)). As we can see, the results
bf UNRAC are more consistent with the exact results than
either FRANTIC or PL-MODT. In fact, with the use of the first
3 terms approximation, UNRAC produces almost identical results
to the ones given in Vesely (1970), see Table 3.2.
3.4 Uncertainty Bounds Evaluator
3.4.1 Introduction
The unreliability of the top event of a fault tree is
evaluated from the unreliabilities of the basic events con-
tained in the tree. This quantification is a straight forward
process when the basic events (components) parameters (failure
rate, repair rate, etc.) are exactly known. However, uncer-
tainties exist in components' data because:
1) lack of consistent information on the failure and
repair rates,
2) diversity in manufacturing specifications.
Therefore, any quantification analysis is incomplete without
information on the uncertainty of the top event unreliability.
There are two general methods of propagating uncertainties.
One of these is an analytic approach, Lee and Apostalakis
(1976), where the authors first use the Johnson family
118
Min. Cut Sets Component Failure Rate
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x 106hr-1
2.6
3.5
5.0
8.0
Fig. 3.14: Fault tree diagram. Minimal cut sets
and failure data of an example Reactor
Protection System (Vesely (1970)).
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Table 3.2 COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY WITH
RESULTS OF KITT FOR AN EXAMPLE FAULT TREE
Time Vesely (1970) 1st Term Approx. 1st 3 terms Approx.
x 103hr
Exact Q Q Q
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.0 3.49 - 03 3.569 - 03 3.488 - 03
2.0 1.32 - 02 1.379 02 1.317 - 02
3.0 2.80 - 02 2.998 - 02 2.80 - 02
4.0 4.70 - 02 5.152 - 02 4.704 - 02
5.0 6.95 - 02 7.782 - 02 6.95 - 02
10.0 2.12 - 01 2.636 - 01 2.117 - 01
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distributions, (see Hahn and Shapiro (1967)), to approximate
each components' distributions, then find the first two
moments of the top event function. Finally they use these
two moments to estimate confidence bounds by standard inequal-
ities (e.g. Tchebychev, Cantelli) or empirical distributions
(moment matching technique). This method is only useful for
small fault trees.
The other approach is the Monte-Carlo simulation routine
which is presented in this section and can be used to obtain
an empirical Bayes estimation of the probability interval of
the system reliability (unreliability). In this procedure,
each components failure probability is represented by an
appropriate distribution. And in order to evaluate the top
event probability, each components failure probabilities
will be simulated randomly according to their respective dis-
tributions. One of the drawbacks of this technique is that a
high degree of resolution for the top event distribution,
requires that the sampling be done a large number of times.
Error propagation by means of Monte-Carlo simulation has
previously been investigated in the Reactor Safety Study, [WASH
1400 (1975)) and many ideas and assumptions used in this
study are adopted from that report. Several codes have been
written to compute the probability distribution of the top
event, i.e. SAMPLE (WASH 1400 (1975)), LIMITS (Lee and Salem
(1977)), MOCARS (Matthews (1977)).
All the above mentioned codes require user-supplied
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function as input to identify the logical dependence of the
components in the system that is being analyzed. For a very
large fault tree and/or for a medium tree but with a lot of
repetitive events, the construction of this equation is a non-
trivial process and there is a high probability of introducing
errors. Therefore, there is an incentive to have a Monte-
Carlo simulator coupled with our unreliability analysis code.
3.4.2. Monte-Carlo Simulator Used in UNRAC
The Monte-Carlo routine used in conjunction with UNRAC is
called MCSIM (Monte-Carlo SIMulation). Here we will cite
the mathematical concept of the Monte-Carlo simulation without
proof, and the reader will be referred to Dixon and Massey
(1957), Cashwell and Everett (1959), Hammersley and Handscomb
(1964), and Mann et al. (1974) for details.
MCSIM allows simulation to be carried out for fault trees
having the following component types:
1) components with constant failure probability
2) non-maintained component
3) monitored component
4) periodically tested components.
And it can accomodate the following types of distributions
for the component's parameters:
1) exponential
2) lognormal
3) gamma
4) normal
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It also has the following capabilities:
1) permits simulation for both the average and the time
dependent unreliability, and
2) allows propagation of error bounds on the following
failure parameters:
a) failure rate
b) mean repair time
c) mean test time.
All the aforementioned properties are encoded in the
XVART routine.
In general, there exist two steps in every Monte-Carlo
simulation code used in reliability analysis. First, one
simulates the desired distribution and then sorts the
results in an ascending or descending order. Therefore, there
exist two time consuming steps that one has to overcome in
order to have a comparatively efficient code. For the first
step, numerous reports on accelerating random number generation
have been written. Among these are: Conveyou and MacPherson
(1967), MacLaren, et al. (1964), Marsaglia, et al. (1964a) and
(1964b). The above authors discuss the fast methods to
generate Uniform, Exponential and Normal random numbers. And,
in general, these are sufficient to generate any kind of dis-
tributions random numbers. For example, if one wants to
generate a Gamma random number, oneneeds a combination of
Exponential and Uniform random numbers. In the case of Normal
random numbers, one can use either the Central Limit Theorem
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or use a combination of Uniform random numbers. Marsaglia et
al. (1964a) suggest that the latter method needs less storage
than the former one. Here we discuss how to generate a
Uniform random number between zero and one, U (0,1).
According to McGrath et al. (1975) for computers with an
available word length less than or equal to 32 bits, the most
efficient random number generator has the following form:
Xn+l = a Xn(Mod 2) (3.17).
where
P is the number of bits (excluding sign) in a word;
for IBM 370, P = 31
a is called the generator which should be carefully
selected
Xi(Mod 2P ) is the remainder of Xi/2P
The above routine for generating a random number is fast
and will produce numbers whose properties approximate random-
ness sufficiently close for valid use in Monte-Carlo simulation;
provided that special care is taken in choosing a proper
generator. McGrath et al. (1975) suggest a = 513 In general,
Xi repeats itself after at most 2P steps. For further infor-
mation about different distributions random number generators,
see Appendix C.
In order to accelerate the sorting routine, we use a
procedure developed by Shell (1956) and used in LIMITS Code.
Figure 3.16 shows the difference between SAMPLE and LIMITS
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Fig. 3.16: The execution time of the LIMITS
and the SAIPLE Codes (Lee Salem(1977)).
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execution time for a special case which appeared in Lee and
Salem (1977). The flow chart of the sorting routine is shown in
Appendix C.
Another important consideration of the Monte-Carlo simu-
lation is the accuracy. The accuracy of a simulation can be
indicated in several ways. An example of these is the simple
non-parametric measurement of the accuracy of an estimated
distribution by sampling given by Dixon and Massey (1957). An
example of their accuracy measure for large sample size N can
be expressed as:
Pr(IXs - Xp < 1.36) = 0.95 (3.18)
Where Xs is the estimated distribution fractile, and Xp is the
corresponding exact cumulative distribution value of the under-
lying population from which the sample was randomly picked.
This measure of accuracy is too conservative and requires a
large number of samples. For example, if we want to be 95%
sure that the estimated distribution does not deviate more
than 0.01 from the exact distribution throughout the entire
range, a sample size of not less than 18,496 is required.
Cashwell and Everett (1959) found the following equation by
using Tchebychev's inequality and binomial sampling:
t u 2
Pr N i e = n e du + R (3.19)
Where N is the number of trials M is the number of success,
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t = N and q = 1-P. The quantity R is the error associated
- pq
with the probability measure and is given by:
t2
IRI.< e 2 + 0.2 + 0.25 Ip-q + e (320)/R1. < q Npq e (3.20)
R 2Npq Npq
Equation 3.19 can be put into a more familiar format:
P (l PI < e) = erf(-t) + R (3.21)
The above set of equations do not have any specific limitation
as to where it can be used. They are applicable to any distri-
bution as long as the sampling is taken from an identically
distributed random variable.
In Eqn. 3.21, M is the actual probability limit associated
with Xp which is the P fractile point in our simulated distri-
bution, and if we denote it as X(P), then we can write:
Pr(JX(P) - P < ) = erf(-t) + R (3.22)
For a given number of trials N, and P, the above probability
is constant and will not vary with distribution. For example,
if we fix N = 2000, P = 0.95 and -= 0.4%, then
Pr(lX(O.95) - 0.951 0.004) = erf(0.58) = 0.5879
IRI = 0.039
which indicates that with probability 58.79%, the value calcu-
lated for the 95% confidence limit lies between 94.6% and 95.4%
confidence limits, The maximum error in this case is 3.9%.
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MCSIM gives this information with the final top event unavail-
ability.
3.5 On the Distribution of Input Variables
This section is devoted to a description of the various
forms of distributions that are used in this work for
expressing the unreliabilities of input variables, i.e.
failure rates, repair rates, etc. The question of how these
forms can be obtained from existing information, theoretical
models, engineering judgement or subjective considerations, is
not addressed in this study and the reader will be referred to
Mann et al. (1974).
The input variables of the various components of a system
are assumed to be positive random variables taking values in
any interval of the positive real axis. The following are the
list of Pdf considered in various parts of this study.
A. Gamma Probability Density Function (pdf)
The gamma pdf is used to describe the distribution of
continuous random variable bounds at one end. The gamma Pdf
is defined by:
X tn.-l -),t
f C(t;nk)= t>O,A>O, n >.O (3.2,3)
Yf(t;nX) 0 elsewhere
where r(n) is the complete gamma function defined by
r(l) = xlexdx (3.24)
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and if n is a positive integer then:
r() = (n. - 1)! (3.25)
In the definition of the gamma distribution Eqn. (3.23)
n can take on any positive value. When n is restricted to
integers, the gamma distribution has been referred to as Er-
langian Distribution. When q= 1, gamma distribution will be
an Exponential distribution. In this study we used a general
second order Erlangian distribution and an exponential distri-
bution whose pdf's are defined by:
a) 2nd order Erlangian, n = 2
f(t;X) { A te t(3.26)
0 elsewhere t > X> 
b) exponential
e ACXt
f(t;X) X= l  > 0, t > 0 (3.27)
B. The Lognormal Probability Density Function
The lognormal pdf describes the distribution of a con-
tinuous random variable bounded from below by zero and whose
logarithm is distributed according to a normal pdf with para-
meter and a. The normal distribution has the following Pdf:
fN(t;a) = 1 exp[- (t -p) ]
aE 2a t
a > 0 + < < - (3.28)
Thus, the lognormal pdf is defined by:
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(1 JL1 2exp[- -- (nt I
flt;V02)=t / 2
0 elsewhere t >0, a > 0, (3.29)
- < < -X
The first four moments of the above distributions are given in
Table 3.3.
To generalize the equations (3.24, 2.36, 2.37, 2.28, and
3.29) in order to describe a random variable that has an
interval other than [0,1], say [X,1], we replace t by (t-X)
in the aforementioned equations.
3.6 Moment Matching Method
A distribution is completely defined once all its
moments are known. However, many distributions can be ade-
quately described by the first four moments. In addition, the
first four moments play an important role in fitting empirical
distribution and in approximating the distribution of a random
variable.
Wilks (1962) argues that probability density functions
(pdf) of bounded random variables with a finit.e number of
lower moments in common exhibit similarities, since in the
limit (all moments the same) they would coincide in a unique
pdf. The unreliability of a system being a probability, is
bounded because it can take values only in the interval [0,1],
and therefore, the moment matching can be applied if its n
first moments are known. Obviously, the more moments that are
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available, the more exact the approximation would be. In
most instances, however, the first four moments are adequate.
This is the case when a two parameters pdf (like the ones
presented in Section 3.4.1 or a member of the Johnson or
Pearson families) is chosen as an approximation. The third
and fourth moments determine the shape or the "type" of the
distribution and the first two define its parameters. More
precisely, the shape of the distribution is partly character-
ized by: (1) its third central moment or Skewness which is a
measure of the asymmetry or the distribution, and (2) its
fourth central moment or Kurtosis which is related to its
peakedness. In order to make these two "measures" of the
shape of a pdf independent from its scale, the following
coefficients are defined:
coefficient of Skewness: Bi. 3/21 (3.30)
and
coefficient of Kurtosis: 02 2 (3.31)
When k denotes the kth central moment of a random variable
or:
_ = 1 [ - p 1]k f(R) a (3.32)
Where
f(R) is the pdf of (unreliability or unavailability)
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p1 denotes the first moment about the origin and is:
R f(R) dR (3.33)
If we denote Pk to be kth moment about the origin or
-kk, _ fo Rk f(R)dR (3.34)
Then we have:
' 2
= 2 2 - (p) (3.35)
1 1 t V 3
u3 =3 - 3P2 (P1 + 2(p1) (3.36)
' ' ' ' 2 ' 4
14 4 - 4P3 + 62(P1) - 3(pl) (3.37)
In cases where the form and parameters of the pdf under
study is unknown, the central moments, k' may be calculated
by replacing k by () Xk in the preceding expressions,
i= 1
where Xi, = i=l,2.--n, are the values of n given observations
(i.e., simulated top event reliability in Section 3.4). Thus,
P2 will read:
I 2 1 n 2(338)
P2 = _n Xi - - ( Xi)3.38)
i=l n i=l
The above equation leads to what statisticians call a
"biased estimate," Therefore, we use the corresponding un-
biased formula which is:
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n n
n i=l x . (il Xi)2
i= i1X)2(3.39)
n(n-l)
to estimate the variance of the distribution.
Hence, if the coefficient 81 and 2 can be obtained, the
shape of the distribution is approximately defined. Fig. 3.17
and Fig. 3.18 give numerical values of the coefficient and
of the various "theoretical" type of densities presented in
Section 3.4.1, and Johnson distributions (see Hahn and Shapiro
(1967)) respectively. From these figures, the type of density
that has the same a1 and 2 with the sought pdf can be
obtained.
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J1
Fig. 3.17: Region in (8,1 2) plane for
various distributions
(Hahn Shapiro (1967)).
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CHAPTER 4: APPLICATION AND RESULTS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a series of examples to vali-
date the effectiveness of the mathematical models developed
in Chapter 2 which have been encoded in UNRAC. As stated
earlier, (See Chapter 3), the UNRAC code consists of three
different parts, namely, cut set generator, unreliability
evaluator, and Monte-Carlo simulator. In Section 3.2 the
effectiveness of the cut set generator part was discussed by
comparing the UNRAC results with other published data. In
order to validate other parts and the models encoded, several
systems have been analyzed using UNRAC code and the results
have been compared with the other codes and/or published data.
They are:
1) Auxiliary Feed Water System (AFWS) an example from
WASH 1400.
2) An example of an electrical system
3) A Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)
4) A High Pressure Injection System (HPIS), an example
given in WASH 1400.
4.2 Auxiliary Feed Water System (AFWS), A Comparison with
WASH 1400
The function of AFWS is to provide feed water to the
secondary side of the steam generators upon loss of main
feed water. In this typical example, the system consists of
three pump trains, two condensate storage tanks and several
138
different types of valves. Figure 4.1 shows a simplified
flow diagram of the AFWS that appeared in WASH 1400 (1975).
The simplified (reduced) fault tree is shown in Fig. 4.2.
Table 4.1 shows the data used in both WASH 1400 and this
study.
The main objective of this example is to show the
requirement of time dependent unreliability analysis for the
standby systems in order to find the unreliability or unavail-
ability per demand. In WASH 1400, the average point estimate
unavailability of the components was used to find the top
event (system) unavailability for a given interval. The
pictorial summary of the results is shown in Fig. 4.3.
For this study, Fig. 4.2 was further reduced by using
the techniques mentioned in Section 3.2.2 in order to
eliminate the unnecessary evaluations. The fault tree used
to input to UNRAC is shown in Fig. 4.4. UNRAC generated 145
cut sets and evaluated the average and time dependent unreli-
ability of the AFWS for the interval of zero to one year.
The results showed that the unavailability per demand of the
AFWS (average unreliability over 1 year) was 3.114x 10 .
The maximum unreliability which caused by inspection period
was 4.18x 10 2 and the minimum unreliability resulted after
each repair was 5.786x 10 . Figure 4.5 shows the time
dependent unreliability of the system over the interval of
60 days. As can be seen, the unreliability of the system is
*NOTE: The exact results were given here for possible future
check.
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Table 4.1: AUX-FEED WATER SYSTEM COMPONENT
FAILURE CHARACTERISTICS DATA
FAILURE TEST FIRST
RATE INTERVAL INTERVAL
(PER HR) (DAYS) (DAYS)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.0 OE-07
3.00E-05
0.0
1.0OOE-07
0.0
0.0
5.10OE-06
0.0
3.00E-07
0.0
3.0 OE-05
3.00E-0S
0.0
0.0
3.00E-07
0.0
5.1OE-06
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.00E+01
3.OE+01
0.0
3.00E+01
0.0
0.0
3.OOE+01
0.0
3.00E+01
0.0
3.00E+01
3.00E+01
0.0
0.0
3.00E+01
0.0
3.00E+01
0.00.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
I OOE+01
1 .00E+01
0.0
1.00E+01
0.0
0.0
2.OOE+01
0.0
2. OOE+01
0.0
2.00E+01
3.00E+01
0.0
0.0
3.OOE+01
0.0
3.OOE+01
TIME FOR
TESTING
(HRS)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.50E+00
1.50E+00
0.0
1.50E+00
0.0
0.0
1.50E+00
0.0
1.50E+00
0.0
1.50E+00
1.50E+00
0.0
0.0
1.50E+00
0.0
1.50E+00
TIME FOR VRRIDE
PEPAIR UNAVAIL
(HRS)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.20E+00
4.20E+00
0.0
4.20E+00
0.0
0.0
4.20E+00
0.0
4.20E+00
0.0
4.20E+00
4.20E+00
0.0
0.0
4.20E+00
0.0
4.20E+00
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.OOE+00
1.00E+00
0.0
1. OOE+00
0.0
0.0
1. OOE+00
0.0
1, OOE+00
0.0
1, OOE+O 00
1.OOE+00
0.0
0.0
1.00E+00
0.0
1. 00E+00
COMPONENT
NO,
1
2
3
4
S
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18.
19,
20
21
22
23
RESIDUAL
UNAVAIL
5. 10E-07
1.00E-04
I.00E-04
.00E-04
1.00E-04
1.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.OCE-03
.00E-03
t.00E-03
7.50E-05
1. E-02
2.00E-03
3.70E-02
1.00E-03
1.OOE-04
1.OOE-03
1.00E-03
1,OOE-03
1.00E-04
1,.00E-03
3.70E-02
2. OE-03
! 
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10 20 30 40- 50 60
Time (Days)
Fig. 4.5: AFWS time dependent unavailabilities as calculated
by UNRAC.
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highly time dependent, and varies by 3 order of magnitude.
This strong time dependence of the unreliability is not
revealed in WASH 1400 where only the average value is
reported. This additional information can be useful in
providing further insight into accidental analysis. The
UNRAC code is also able to evaluate the importance of each
component in producing the top event. The code determines
importance by two methods: (1) Birnbaum's measure, and
(2) Fussell-Vesely measure. Birnbaum's measure is the simple
differentiating method and is evaluated by the following
equation:
(B.I.)i Q(t) = Q(t) - Q(t) (4.1)
qi(t)=l qi(t)=O
where
Q(t) = top event unreliability equation, given in
Eqn. (3.12),
qi(t) = unreliability of component i,
(B.I)i = Birnbaum's importance of component i.
whereas the Fussell-Vesely measure of importance is defined
by:
(F.V.I) = Prob. (cut sets containing component i) (4.2)
Q(t)
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The reader should note that these two equations determine
different measures of importance. The Fussell-Vesely
determines the criticality importance whereas the Birnbaum's
determines the actual importance of the component (Lambert
(1975)). The UNRAC results for the importance analysis based
on the average component's unreliability is given in Table
4.2. As would be expected, Birnbaum's measure shows that the
single failure (failure of component #1) has the highest
importance, whereas the Fussell-Vesely measure shows that the
common power failure to both electrical pumps (failure of
component #12) has the highest contributions (i.e., the
component which contributes most to the top event).
To find the top event uncertainty bound and the approxi-
mated distribution, three different runs were made. For the
first run we used the average point estimate unavailability
of each component with the error factors on these estimates
given in Table 4.3. The assumed distribution for each compo-
nent involved was considered to be a log-normal. The first
two columns of Table 4.4 shows the top event unavailabilities
with its respective confidence levels. The error factor, which
is calculated by the following equation, was found to be 3.79.
9 x x .50
.5 X0.05
where
Xi is the value of top event unavailability with respect
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Table 4.2: COMPONENT'S IMPORTANCE CALCULATIONS
OF AFWS USING FUSELL-VESELY AND
BIRNBAUM MEASURES
COMPONENT FUSSEL-VESELY BIRNBAUM'S
NO, MEASURE MEASURE
I 1.6192E-03 1 .0000E+00
2 6.3498E-05 2.0000E-04
3 6.3498E-05 2.0000E-04
4 6.3498E-05 2.000OOE--04
5 6.3498E-05 2.0000E-04
6 4.6607E-03 1.4680E-02
7 1.5392E-01 1.4680E-02
8 6.4245E-01 1.4680E-02
9 4.6607E-02 1.4630 E-02
10 1.5061E-01 1.4680E-02
11 5.1001E-03 2.1419E-02
12 6.8001E-01 2.1419E-02
13 2.4262E-02 1 .2867E--03
14 1.5115E-01 1.2867E-03
15 1.3235E-02 1 .,2867E-03
16 4.0850E04 1 .2867E-03
17 5.6086E-02 1.2867E-03
18 5.6619E-02 1.2853E-03
19 6.8001E-02 2.1419E-02
20 4.0807E-04 1.2853E-03
21 1.2988E-02 1 .2853E-03
22 1.5098E-01 1 .2853E-03
23 2.41 39E-02 1 .2853E-03
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Table 4.3: AUX-FEED IWATER COMPONENT'S
AVERAGE UNAVAILABILITY ERROR FACTOR (EF)
Component
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
EF on Average
Unavailability
30.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
6.0
3.0
10.0
3.0
30.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
6.0
3.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
3.0
6.0
10.0
3.0
Component's Unavail-
ability Distribution
L*
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
*L stands for Log normal
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to ith confidence level.
To approximate the top event distribution, the method
discussed in Section 3.6 was used. By using Fig. 3.18 and
the values of 81 and 82 which were 11.5 and 20.3 respectively,
the top event distribution is bound to be a Johnson SB distri-
bution with the following general equation (Hahn and Shapiro
(1967)):
(X ) exp 1[y+;n(Xe 2)]  (4 4)
,/- (x-e).(A,-x+e)- p Y Xx+e
g<X< a+ , -a <Y <+ , >0, - < <+c
Since x is the unreliability value, it is bounded between
zero and one, hence; x=l and e=O. To find the other para-
meters, y and n, the following set of equations were used:
Z- Z
= - (4.5)(x. ) x + - x)
In-X -a
= Za n - x
where a = percentile > .50
Z a is the alOOth percentile for a standard normal
variate
n = are the estimated values for n and y
153
x = is the alOOth percentile for the calculated data
Substituting for , , n and y in Eqn. (4.4) we get:
f(y) dy = 1 e 2 dy, (4.6)
-o <y < + o
where:
Y + in l-x
Column 4 of the Table 4.4 also summarizes the estimated
values of top event unavailability using approximated distri-
bution given by Eqn. (4.6) with i and evaluated at
a = 0.95. Column 3 of Table 4.4 gives the top event distri-
bution assuming a log-normal distribution with the median of
6.0310E-04 and an error factor of 3.97. The latter approxi-
mation to the top event distribution was used in WASH 1400.
Figure 4.6 clarifies the difference between the actual results
and the above approximation distributions results. As can be
seen, for the majority of the data the simple log-normal
distribution can approximate the top event distribution very
well. This figure supports the validity of the WASH 1400
assumption of log-normal distribution for the whole system.
However, the distribution that best fits the top event is
found to be the SB Johnson distribution with the following
parameters: X= i, = 6.48730E-5, rn= 1.1446445, y= 8.6154013.
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The above values were found by matching 25th, 50th, and 75th
percentile of top event with the fitted distribution (of.
Eqn. (4.4)). It is worth mentioning that the value of e was
found by the following equation:
A*A(x 0 5 )(E+X-xa) (Xa- E) (A+- X 5)
' ~ ' (4.7)
y + - X 0.5 ) (Xl-a - ) ( + X )(X0.5 - )
where
A = assumed to be 1
a = is the same parameter as in Eqn. (4.5)
For the second run we used error factors on the indi-
vidual component's characteristics (i.e., failure rate,
repair rate, etc.). Table 4.5 shows the data used to
evaluate the top event uncertainty bound. The error factor
of the top event was found to be 3.654. The evaluation was
carried out by simulating each component's characteristics
distribution with Monte Carlo sampling and finding the
average unavailability of each component at every iteration
to calculate the top event values. Again the simple log-
normal distribution seems to approximate the top event
quite well (See Fig. 4.7).
For the third run, first the error factor on some of the
component's parameters data were changed to see the effect of
the longer tail for log-normal distribution on the top event.
-mI
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Table 4.5: AFWS COMPONENT FAILURE CHARACTERISTICS
ERROR FACTORS DATA
LAMOA DIS TC DIS TR 015 ORESID DIS
0.0
.0.00.00.0
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
L 3.0000.0
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
0,0
0.0
.0.0
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
L 3.000
0.0
t 3.000
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
L 3.000
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
30.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3;000
L 6.000
L 3.C00
10.000
L 3.000
30.000
3.00-3
L 3.000
3.000
L 6.000
3.000
L 3.003
L 3.000
10.000
3.000
L 3.000
i O. 000
L 3.000
The values in columns 2,4,6 and 8 are the error
factors on failure rate, average test time, average
repair time and residual unavailability of each com-
ponent, respectively.
COMPONENT
NO.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1s
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.000
3.000
0.0
3.000
0.0
0.0
3.000
0.0
3.000
0.0
10.000
10.000
0.0
0.0
3.000
0.0
3.000
L
L
L
L
L
L
I
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L 
L
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Second, it was assumed that the mean test and repair time
follow a gamma distribution. Then the top event unreliability
was evaluated for 1200 and 5000 Monte-Carlo iterations for
both cases. Table 4.6 summarizes the input error factors for
this run, and Table 4.7 and 4.8 give the top event unrelia-
bility computations. The results show although there exist
differences between the values of the top event unreliability
for 1200 and 5000 iterations, the 1200 iterations will suffice
for the analysis.
In another run, the importance of the components in the
system were evaluated based on the assumption that electric
pump number 1 is down, i.e., under the test at 721 hours.
Based on the above assumption and knowing that when one
pump is down the components in that pump train are ineffec-
tive for delivering water, the UNRAC regenerates the new
minimal cut set by discarding all the failed and ineffective
components. This capability is provided in order to make the
code more versatile in importance analysis while preserving
other features of the code and, in addition, the original
system fault tree is only required input to the code for all
the subsequent evaluations. The code internally changes the
system configuration by the relevant data that user will
supply as input for the intended job. The results of the
importance analysis at 721 hours of operation is shown in
Table 4.9, As can be seen, at this time of operation, the
turbo-pump is the dominant component in the top event
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Table 4.6: AFWS COMPONENT FAILURE CHARACTERISTICS
ERROR FACTOR DATA, AN EXAMPLE FOR LONG
TAIL LOG-NORMAL AND GAMMA DISTRIBUTIONS
LAMOA DIS
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
10.000
10.000
0.0
10.000
0.0
0.0
10.000
0.0
10.000
0.0
10.000
10.000
0.0
0.0
10.000
0.0
10.000
TC DIS
0.00.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.0000.0
0.0
L 3,0000.0
L 3. 0000.0
L 3.000
L 3.0000.0
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
*
TR DS QRESID DIS
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
L 3.000
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
30. 000
10.000
10. 000
10.000
10. 000
10. 000
L 10.000
L 10.000
10.000
L 10.000
30.000
3.000
L 10.000
10. 000
L 10.000
10. 000
L 10.000
L 10.000
10.000
10.000
L 10.000
10.000
L 10.000
*TC and TR distributions are changed to gammna distribution for
calculating the values in Table 4.8.
COMPONENT
NO.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
- -- --
fr
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Table 4.7: THE EFFECT OF THE MONTE-CARLO
SIMULATION TRIALS ON THE TOP
EVENT DISTRI BUTI ON
Level
of
CONFIDENCE
0.5%
1 .0%
2.5%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0X
25.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
75.0%
80.0%
85.0%
90.0%
95.0%
97.5%
·99.0%
99.5%
Simulation Trials
1200
TOP EVENT VAL
7.5631E-05
8.6380E-05
1 0510E-04
1.3432E-04
1.8046E-04
2.2543E-04
2.6124E-04
3.0705E-04
3.6497E-04
4.8247E-04
5,.9415E-04
7.6224E-04
1.0068E-03
1,.2071E-03
1.4576E-03
1.8216E-03
2.5920E-03
4,.3103E-03
5.8253E-03
1.1847E-02
1,.9284E-02
5000
TOP EVENT VAL
6.8032E-05
8,1885E-05
1.0826E-04
1.3495E-04
1.8212E-04
2.2493E-04
2.66665E-04
3.0928E-04
3,.5501E-04
4.6209E-04
5.8590E-04
7.5284E-04
1.0201E-03
1.2202E-03
1.4824E-03
1.9242E-03
2.6107E-03
4.3677E-03
6.8399E-03
1.2950E-02
1.9408E-02
I III
. i i ] ii iiii_ _ 
.. - -
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Table 4.8: THE EFFECT OF THE MONTE-CARLO
SIMULATION TRIALS ON THE TOP
EVENT DISTRIBUTION 'FOR MIXED
COMPONENT'S FAILURE DISTRIBUTIONS
Level
of
CONFiOENCE
0.5%
1.0%
2.5%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
75.0%
80.0%
85.0%
90.0%
95.0%
97.5%
99.0%
99.5%
Simulation Trials
1200
TOP EVENT VAL
8.4943E-05
9.8884E-05
1.2106E-04
1.5033E-04
1.9731E-04
2.2975E-04
2.6790E-04
3.1991E-04
3.5748E-04
4.6741E-04
5.8465E-04
7.8831E-04
1.0462E-03
1.2104E-03
1.4565E-03
1.7495E-03
2.4342E-03
4.2475E-03
6.5750E-03
1.2499E-02
1.6695E-02
5000
TOP EVENT
7.6879E-05
8.8165E-05
1.1801E-04
1.4395E-04
1.8879E-04
2.2688E-04
2.6786E-04
3.1454E-04
3.5738E-04
4.6144E-04
5.8958E-04
7.6327E-04
1.0250E-03
1.1997E-03
1.4865E-03
1.8652E-03
2.5818E-03
4.2737E-03
6.9437E-03
1 .2298E-02
1.6695E-02
VAL
I 11 . J I
- -- 
--- -r
i i . i i i
_
_
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Table 4.9: IMPORTANCE ANALYSIS OF AFWS
COMPONENTS GIVEN THAT ONE OF
THE PUMP TRAIN IS OUT OF SERVICE
COMPONENT FUSSELL-VESELY BIRNBAUM'S
NO, ,tASURE MEASURE
1 4.524 E-04 1.0000E+00
2 1.7744E-05 2.0000E-04
3 1.7744E-05 2.0000CE-04
4 1.7744E-05 2.0000E-04
5 1.7744E-05 2.0000OE-04
6 5.3813E-03 6.0653E-02
7 6.1554E-02 5.0653E-02
8 8.2237E-01 6.0653E-02
9 5.3813E-02 6.0653E-02
10 5.6393E-02 6.0653E-02
11 1.2359E-03 108574F.-02
12 1;6479E-01 1.8574E-02
13 5.3087E-02 1.8574E-02
14 6.0973E-01 1.8574E-02
15 1.7663E-02 1.6574E-02
16 1.6479E-03 1.8574E-02
17 1.34885E-01 1.8574E-02
19 1.6479E-02 1.B574E-02
- $ ,. 
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unavailability with the value of 8.2237E-01 (See Fussell-
Vesely measures), where as Birnbaum's measure again predicts
that the single failure has the highest importance.
For the final run in this section, the independent fail-
ure of the components in each pump train were assumed to have
an Exclusive OR (EOR) gate logic. In fact, this is the
realistic assumption, because when the manual valve or
check valve fails in the pump train, that train will be
unable to deliver water. In the Table 4.1, we have initial-
ized 3 components of each pump train to be a periodically
tested component. Therefore, in their operational history
they are unavailable with the probability of 1 while under
the test. Hence, for the top event evaluation using the
general minimal cut sets we may overestimate the unavail-
ability of the system. To avoid such evaluations, those
OR gates that have periodically tested components should be
replaced by EOR gate. The EOR gate will put the gate output
to 1 when one of its input has occurred. While for the case
of OR gate the output value is greater than 1. To check our
system for such possibility, the independent failure of each
pump train was assumed to be interconnected by an EOR gate.
Then the technique mentioned to transform the EOR gate to
simple AND, OR and NOT gate (See Fig. 3.3), were used.
The final results showed that the peak values shown in
Fig. 4.5 are overestimated by a factor of three. It is worth
mentioning that, care must be taken in preparing the new fault
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tree with EOR gate. For example, in the data for AFWS we
scheduled the simultaneous testing for the periodically
tested components in each pump train, i.e., in turbine
pump train. The pump, the manual valve, and solenoid valve
which open the steam, are tested each month at the same
time. Now if we use the EOR gate for these three components
then the output value for the time of the test will be zero
instead of real value of 1. The actual value of the maximum
unreliability during each testing period is also shown in
Fig. 4.5 (symbolically shown by o on the figure). As stated
earlier, these points are a factor 3 less.
4.3 An Example of an Electrical System, Comparison of UNRAC
with FRANTIC and BIT-FRANTIC
Figure 4.8 shows a simple electrical system used by
Modarres (1979). The main function of this system is to
provide light when the switch is closed. Relay No. 1 is a
normally open (N.O.) relay and its contacts are closed when
the switch is open. Relay No. 2 is a normally closed relay
and it will be deenergized (contacts will be opened) if the
switch is closed. Figure 4.9 shows a fault tree of Fig. 4.8
which neglects operator error, wiring failures and secondary
failures. Table 4.10 shows the arbitrarily selected data
that has been used to analyze the system in Modarres (1979).
First, the system structure function was formulated
and provided as input to both FRANTIC (Vesely and Goldberg
(1977)) and UNRAC. These results termed "exact" for the two
cases are shown in Fig. 4.10. Second, to compare the results
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of UNRAC and BIT-FRANTIC (Karimi and Wolf (1978)), the fault
tree was directly input and the first term approximation
(rare event) (cf. Eqn. (3.13)) was used to find the top event
unreliability. Figure 4.10 also summarizes the results of
these runs (1st term). As can be seen, UNRAC and FRANTIC
exact results are only comparable where the unreliabilities
are small, i.e., less than 10- 2. The results of UNRAC
(Exact) and UNRAC (lst term approx.) are consistent to a
higher degree of unreliability than the former case. The
difference between UNRAC (Exact) and UNRAC (Ist term approx.)
at the end of each interval are caused by the approximation
used in evaluating the top event. The rare event approxima-
tion results in a conservative value when the average
unavailability of basic components are on the order of 10'1
or higher. The results of BIT-FRANTIC (1st term approx.)
are more conservative; however, it is believed that the
UNRAC results are more realistic.
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rower
supply 2
Fig 4.8: An example of an electrical system
(Modarres (1979))
8 9 1
Fig 4.9: A fault tree diagram of the example
electrical system
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Fig. 4.10: Comparison of time dependent unavailabilities of the
electrical system as calculated by UNRAC, FRANTIC and
BIT-FRANTIC.
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4.4 A Chemical and Volume Control System, (CVCS)
The Chemical and Volume Control System provides a means
for injection of control poison in the form of boric acid
solution, chemical additions for corrosion control and reactor
coolant cleanup and degasification. This system also adds
makeup water to the reactor coolant system (RCS), provides
seal water injection to the reactor coolant pump seals,
reduces the inventory of radioactivity in RCS and can be used
as a high pressure injection system. The typical system under
study has three pump trains which have to pump 44 gal/min. of
the purified water from the volume control tank to the reactor
coolant pump seals and RCS. Figure 4.11 shows the simplified
pump trains of the CVCS. Each pump can only deliver a maximum
of 44 gal/min. under the design condition. Therefore, we shall
assume that two pumps are needed to meet the design requirement
of 44 gal/min. In addition, safety regulations require that
two out of three pumps be available except that technical
specifications do permit two pumps to be down for a period of
not more than 24 hours. Hence, in our analysis we defined the
top event failure to be the simultaneous unavailability of any
two pump trains. Figure 4.12 shows the simplified fault tree
diagram of the system. In order to be able to compare the
results of UNRAC with BIT-FRANTIC, the pumps were modelled
to follow a periodically tested component. In other words we
assumed that each pump undergoes a thorough test and repair
after each T2 days, and if any pump fails between the test
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interval it will be restored without changing its failure
probability. To analyze the system under such an assumption,
the data shown in Table 4.11 is used. Figure 4.13 gives the
time dependent unavailability calculated by UNRAC and BIT-
FRA4NTIC. The difference between the results of these two
codes arises from the use of the rare event approximation in
FRANTIC.
In another example it was assumed that the pumps are
normally working during operation (not in stand-by). In this
case, the pumps are unavailable if they are down because of
repair or test. To analyze the system unreliability it was
assumed that there is a 20% chance that the pump needs to be
tested if it fails, i.e. P3 = 0.2 (See Fig. 3.8) and also there
is a 20% chance that the pump trip was spurious and therefore
the pump can be restarted, i.e., P1 = 0.2. The rest of the
data given in Table 4.11 remains unchanged. The results of
the top event unavailability for two types of repair distribu-
tions, namely exponential and 2nd order Erlangian are sum-
marized in Table 4.12.
Having analyzed the CVCS pumping system by one of the
above methods (either assume that the pumps are periodically
maintained or usually running (monitored)), one can check the
design requirement for the system availability. For example,
in the first method, the unavailability per demand of CVCS
pumping system is 3.08x 10 1 or 1 out of three times the
pumping system cannot meet the design requirement. If one
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Fig. 4.13: CVCS time dependent unavailabilities as
calculated by UNRAC and BIT-FRANTIC
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Table 4.12: COMPARISON OF THE CVCS UNAVAILABILITY
CALCULATIONS FOR THE EXPONENTIAL AND
2ND ORDER ERLANGIAN REPAIR DISTRIBUTION
Repair Distribution
'Iop Event Exponential
2nd Order
Erlangi'an
Maximum
Unavailability
Average
Unavailability
6.8817E-04
6.783E-04
1.7144E-03
1.705E-03
Time to reach to
its asymptotic
value Less than 4 days of operation
-
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uses the second method, the maximum unavailability per demand
will be on the order of 1.7x 10 3 It is worth mentioning
that, the above results are typical numbers and cannot be
applied to any CVCS system without validating the data and
the model used.
4.5 A High Pressure Injection System (HPIS), Comparison of
WASH 1400 and UNRAC
The main purpose of this example is to show the applica-
bility of UNRAC for a large fault tree and the time saving
that can be achieved by using the techniques mentioned in
Section 3.2.2 for reducing the fault tree prior to quantifi-
cation. The system chosen for this study is taken from
WASH 1400, Appendix II. For the system description the reader
is referred to the above reference.
Figure 4.14 depicts the simplified flow diagram of a
High Pressure Injection System (HPIS). The original fault
tree of the HPIS has more than 8000 minimal cut sets (Garibba
et al. (1977)). Since at the present time UNRAC is limited to
3000 minimal cut sets, the original fault tree was further
reduced by neglecting the events with negligible unavail-
ability contributions and combining some of the basic events.
The resultant tree, shown in Fig. 4.15, consists of a total
of 90 basic events and 57 gates. UNRAC generates a total of
1718 minimal cut sets, in which there are 11 with single fail-
ure, 104 with double failures and 1603 triple failures per
cut sets.
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WASH 1400 results for single and double failures are:
Qsingles= 1.1 x 10- 3
Qdoubles = 2.5 x 10-3
The UNRAC results using the data given in WASH 1400 for single
and double failures per cut sets are: 1.2x 10 3 and 2.6x10- 3
respectively. The results are therefore quite consistent
with WASH 1400.
In another run, the failure of delivering water from
each pump was considered to be a single basic event. This
time the code generates a total of 99 minimal cut sets in
which there are 11 with single failure, 79 with double fail-
ures and 9 with triple failures per cut sets. The results of
this run was exactly the same as the previous run for single
and double failures.
The CPU time for the second run was a factor of 8 less
than the first run. This reduction in CPU time was the result
of combining the basic events input to each of the three OR
gates, (FCPA, FCPB, FCPC), shown in Fig. 4.15 (sheet 6) and
representing them by one new event. In other words, FCPA,
FCPB, and FCPC were considered to be the basic events and
Fig. 4.15 (sheet 6) was ignored. This action greatly reduced
the number of triple failures and, therefore, results in a
smaller number of minimal cut sets.
I I I II I . .
180
00
".eCAI
".40
-H
l1t
Hra
00
".4
,Im
ee
iI
a
I
I
I
a
il
tHa
ft
&I
'I
, 111 i
Iii!'
i
it!~il
4*4 64 *
181
0o
0o
*tt
H
W
cnw4
0'00U0u
mClww
o
no
041
I4400014
co
-i
.
'000
'.4
a
Ila044
'0
0.
-41
.4
r-A
-H
0T4
i I
'i
i 33
I!1
I'
i
I,
il
I
l
f
Li
I
I 
I 
1 
I !
.
182
U,
0;
'u-Iv34
I1
1
3
183
Qrn
Y aii
Mo
_ _
_ I
a 
_ _
_ _
I en
44
00Pc
,
Co4W
4)
%.Ol
w
0
r,
IA,r
-100
1*
Vz
rX4

O mfel
2 II.,Y
iI,
. XJ
'AJi I
,I
184
* a S. a a a
..
i
* t
4-'
.4i
4)a)
Pd
1-
0
C-
00u
· ii
T
-H
r:4
I
i
185
Ii 
Us
Un
4l
00
'00)4a
C.)
In
-
ta
*r
u
a r-
'A
aO
F4
.
186
I
'tI
;I.
iSt
aXe
> 3
'- p-yo a
eg. IW- I P- W 
t~ul
Al a
0
aa013
Xj U a
s-
9:b
".1
'A
4-i
w4D
.-I
4)
1qJ
Lr0u
o
.-Hr4
·Z4
Ud
5
W.
l
187
CHAPTER 5: SUlARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECCtMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary and Conclusion
Reliability analysis is a method by which the degree of successful
performance of a system under certain stipulated conditions may be
expressed in quantitative terms. In order to establish a degree of suc-
cessful performance, it is necessary to define both the performance
requirement of the system and the expected performance achievement of the
system. The correlation between these two can then be used to formulate
a suitable expression of reliability as illustrated in the following
figure, Green and Bourne (1972).
The first step in a reliability analysis, therefore, is to ascertain
the pattern of variation for all the relevant performance parameters of
the system both from the point of view of requirement as well as from
likely achievement. Performance variations may be due not only to the
physical attributes of the system and its environment, but also the
basic concepts, ideas, and theories which lie behind the system's design.
Having established all the appropriate patterns of variations, the system
should be rigorously examined to check its ability to work in the required
way or fulfill the correct and safe overall function. In order to assess
188
the appropriate probability expression for each pattern, it is useful to
convert the system functional diagram into a logic sequence diagram.
There are two ways to develop the system logic diagram.
1) positive logic
2) negative logic
The positive logic is called reliability block diagram, whereas the
negative logic has acquired different names depending on the types of
logic interconnections. They are
1) fault tree
2) event tree
3) cause consequence chart.
Reliability analysis, by using method of fault tree is the most well-
known analytic method in use today. Event tree and cause consequence
chart (CCC) have also been used; however, by proper rearrangement, one can
easily map the CCC into event-tree and fault tree combinations and both
can be mapped into a set of fault trees for which the top events are the
consequences of the CCC or event tree.
Reliability analysis by using the method of fault tree is known as
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). In FTA, since the system structure logic is
composed of a series of negative (failure) logic, the term reliability is
always replaced by the term "unreliability" and/or "unavailability". The
first step in any FTA is to generate the minimal cut sets which qualita-
tively delineate the paths of system failure through a simultaneous fail-
ure of certain components. The second step in FTA is to find a quanti-
tative value (unreliability or unavailability) for the top event and
evaluate the response of the system unavailability to the change in data
189
and error bounding of the basic components.
In the past decade a number of codes have been written for qualita-
tive and quantitative analysis of the fault tree, and complete analysis
requires a combination of several of these codes. Thus, as FTA becomes
more widely used it is highly desirable to have a single code which does
a complete analysis. The advantage of such a single code is that it
reduces the chance of likely error in the input and output process inher-
ent in using multiple codes and it is for this reason that the present
study has developed such a code. The objective of this thesis was
to develop a code which could generate the minimal cut sets, evaluate
the system unavailability (point estimate and/or time dependent), find
the quantitative importance of each components involved, and calculate
the error bound on the system unavailability evaluation. To develop
such a code various aspects of the methodologies used in REBIT[WOLF (1975)],
KITT IVesely (1970)], FRANTIC (Vesely and Goldberg (1977)], SAIPLE
[WASH 1400 (1975)], and LIMITS [Lee and Salem (1978)] codes were used as
the basis for a single code package.
For generating the minimal cut sets, a portion of REBIT which is
called BIT was used. BIT, at the beginning, was limited to 32 components
and gates and would only accept AND and OR gates. For this study, it has
been modified to accept any kind of gates and its capability has been
increased at the present time to 250 components and/or gates. The cut set
generator, BIT, was bench marked against MODCUT [Modarres (1979)] and WAMCUT
[EPRI (1978)]. It was demonstrated that the BIT code is an efficient
and less time consuming code when generating all the minimal cut sets
(cf. Section 3.2). To accelerate the code even further a discrimina-
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tory procedure based on the cut set size is implemented in the code.
This procedure eliminates cut sets larger than a given size.
For the quantification, a general and consistent set of mathematical
models for calculating component's unavailabilities was developed and
FRANTIC code was restructured to accommodate these models. To evaluate
the importance of each component in producing the top event, the methods
of Birnbaum and Fussel-Vesely were implemented. It is believed that both
methods are necessary in judging the importance of each component.
For error propagation analysis, a routine that allows this simulation
(Monte-Carlo) to be carried out on the component's failure characteristics
(failure rate, repair rate, test rate, etc.) as well as the average
components unavailability was developed. In addition, the routine was
written in such a way that one can use different distributions for the
component's failure characteristics. To rank the top event unavailabilit-
ies in order of their magnetudes to develop a distribution for this param-
eter a fast procedure similar to the one used in LIMITS code has been
employed.
All the above mentioned routines (i.e., cut set generator unavail-
ability evaluator and Monte-Carlo simulator) were coupled and the
combined routine is called UNReliability Analysis Code (UNRAC). The
UNRAC code was bench marked against BIT-FRANTIC [Karimi andWolf (1978)},
KITT IVesely (1970)] and PL-MODT [Modarres (1979)] codes. It was
demonstrated that UNRAC produces results closer to the KITT results than
either BIT-FRANTIC or PL-MODT, (cf. Figure 3.15).
To make UNRAC more versatile, the following features, which are
unavailable in any codes in use today, were implemented;
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1) Using a three state model (cf. Figure 3.9) to represent a
normally operating component in order to allow probabilities for
revealed faults, non-revealed faults, and false failures to be
incorporated in unavailability calculations.
2) Incorporating different distributions for the repair time den-
sity function in order to analyze the effect of different repair
policies on the system unavailability. One such example was
done for a periodically tested component and it was found out
that the constant repair distribution predicts a higher value
for the unavailability per demand than exponential repair
distribution and both predict more than a lognormal distribu-
tion (cf.: Tables 2.1 and 2.2 and Figure 2.9).
Another feature that was incorporated in UNRAC is the capability of
finding the importance of the components given that a component or a
part of the system has already failed. This is an important measure for
the operation managment in order to be able to recommend certain proce-
dures for the maintenance of a component or a subsystem by highlighting
the important components that should not be perturbed.
The capabilities and models encoded in UNRAC have been demonstrated
through a series of examples. Among them was the comparison of UNRAC and
WASH 1400 for AFWS. Although WASH 1400 was unable to reveal the strong
time dependence of the AFWS unavailability it did report the extreme
points unavailabilities which were quite consistent with time dependent
analysis. UNRAC estimated the maximum and minimum unavailability to be
1.4x10-2 and 5.2x10- 5 whereas WASH 1400 reported the values of 2.2x10 2
and 3.5xlO- 5 respectively (cf. Figures 4.3 and 4.5). It was also found
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out that the simple lognormal distribution is a good estimate for the
top event distribution (cf.. Figures 4.6 and 4.7). This finding supports
the validity of WASH 1400 assumption of lognormal for the whole system.
Finally from the experience gained during this study we feel that 1200
iterations for Monte-Carlo simulation are adequate for most cases and
distributions.
5.2 Recommendations
In the course of this study, it was realized that a minimal cut set
generator code requires a large amount of storage capacity. UNRAC
requires a total of 800 K byte of storage capacity for all the routines
encoded. More than half of this storage is used for generating up to
3000 minimal cut sets with a maximum of 30 components per cut sets. How-
ever, this storage requirement could be decreased if a more efficient
method of storage and access could be used. One of the methods that
might be used is a scratch tape for temporary storage of the variables in
the cut set generator subroutine. Another method that might be helpful
is the random access storage routine.
The unavailability evaluator in UNRAC is based on the assumption of
exponential failure time density function. This distribution cannot
accommodate the break-in or wear-out period. Therefore, for better
prediction of time dependent unavailabilities distributions like gamma
or weibull might be more suitable.
Common-mode/common-cause (cm/cc) failure and its prevention has
been a serious concern in the reliability and safety analysis of nuclear
systems during the past few years. Several codes have been written to
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identify the (cm/cc) candidates and analyze the system quantitatively.
Among these, some require a minimal cut set generator to pre-process the
fault tree, i.e., COICAN [Burdick, et al (1976)], ACFIRE (Cate and
Fussell(1977)] and some have already coupled with a cut set generator,
i.e., CCAN II [Rasmuson, et al (1978), BACFIRE II (Rooney and Fussell
(1978)] and SETS (Worrell and Stack (1977)].
The cut set generator in UNRAC, (BIT), uses bit manipulations for
generating and storing the minimal cut sets in the machine word. This
feature of UNRAC would make the code very useful for identifying the
(cm/cc) candidates. However, before any implementation of the (cm/cc)
candidates identifiers a review of the reports by: Rasmuson, et al
(1977), Fleming and Raabe (1978) and Edwards and Watson (1979) are
highly recommended.
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APPENDIX A
DETAILED MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSIONS OF
EQNS. (2.39) AND (3.1)
A.1 Detailed Mathematical Form of the Eqn. (2.39)for Expo-
nential,2nd order Erlangian and Log-normal Repair Time
Density Function
A.l.1 Exponential Repair Time Density Function
If we assume that the repair time density function is:
g(t) = exp(-pt) , with constant 
then G(t)
and the Y term in Eqn. (2.39) will be:
t
G(t) = g(t) = 1- exp(-pt)
T F(T
-
Tc
Y = F(T2 - T ) - exp(-pT) f(t-T) dT
And, since we use exponential distribution for the failure
density function, i.e., f(t)= - exp(-Xt), Eqn. (A.3) can be
reduced to:
Y = 1 - I [exp(-X(T 2 - Tc) (A.4)
Substituting for Y from Eqn. (A.3) in Eqn. (2.39) and re-
adjusting the referrence time to Tc, the resultant equation
(A.1)
(A.2)
(A.3)
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will read as:
Ro(t- T)= 1- exp[-%(t- Tc)] + {exp[-p(t- Tc)]
exp[-A(t- Tc)] - exp[-Uf(t- TC)]]}
Tc< t < T 2 - Tc
= Pf + (l-Pf)
1- exp[-X
1= (l-Pf)
XPf
(T2 -Tc)]- u-X exp[-X(T2-Tc)]
A exp[-X(T 2 -Tc)]
A.1.2 2nd Order Erlangian Repair Time Density Function
In this case the repair time density function is:
(A.6)
and
G(t) = 1- exp(-pt)
Using Eqn. (A.7),
- t exp(-pt)
the Y term will be:
Y = 1- exp[-X(T2-Tc)] - A (1 + ))expP - P-
Substituting for Y and G(.) from Eqns. (A.8) and (A.7) in
Eqn. (2.39) and readjusting
where
(A.5)
(A.7)
(A.8)
g M = v 2t exp(-t)
the reference time to Tc the
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resultant equation will read:
RO (t-TC) =
2
1 - exp[-X(t-T c)] + {(l + -t) exp(-p(t-Tc))
-X (1 + X) [exp(- X(t-T ))
- exp(-u(t-Tc)) 
Tce t< T2 - Tc
where
= Pf + (l-Pf)
1 - exp(-A(T2 -Tc))-
XPf :(l+ -)U X U-X exp(-X(T2 -Tc))
1 + (-Pf)
A.1.3 Log-normal
X (1 + 'X)P - P - exp(-X(T2-Tc))
Repair Time Density Function
In this case, g(t) and G(t) are:
g(t) = 1 exp[-½( nt- )
ta2i-ra o
2
I
1 exp(-½x2)dx
X ryf
where
nt - p
CT
(A.9)
and
(A. 10)
G(t) (A. ll)
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using G(.), the Y term will read
in ffr-I
y J2 a 1 exp(-x )d) f(t-T)dT (A.12)
f2-
O 0
The above equation cannot be reduced further and it is
impossible to find a reduced expression for the Eqn. (2.34).
However, Eqn. (2.34) can be solved by successive numerical
integration, which has been performed to find the results
in the fourth column of Table 2.2.
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A.2 Detailed Mathematical Form of the Eqn. (3.1) for Different
Repair Density Function
Equation (3.1) was produced by applying the Mason's rules
on a general three-state component shown in Fig. 3.9 and is:
fll~s = -- 1 - F(s) (A.13)
s[l- P4F(s) P1 - P3 F(s) P2T(s) G(s)
In this section one of the following repair distributions
will.be assumed to-represent the repair time density function,
g(t). They are:
1) Exponential
2) 2nd order Erlangian
3) Log-normal (Approximated by the combinations of
exponentials
We will also assume that the failure and test time distribu-
tions to be exponential with the constant parameter , v
respectively.
A.2.1 Exponential Repair Time Density Function
In this case, F(s), G(s), and T(s) are:
* A
F(s) = , s (A.14)
+sG(s) = + S (A.15)
*
T(s) = V (A.16)
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Substituting for F(s), G(s) and T(s) from (A.14) to (A.16) in
Eqn. (A.13) and simplifying the result we will get:
~11(S) = (! + s) (v + s)s[s + as + b] (A.17)
where
a = A+ v+ - PP 3A
b = Xv + uvp + P3Xp- PP 3(v + )X
To transform Eqn (A.17) into t domain the method of
partial fraction will be used. To consider all the possible
situations in factorizing the denominator, the results are
divided into three distinct parts,
A) The case where a 2 - 4b> 0
In this case the denominator can be factorized to:
S2 + as + b = (s+ s 1 )( s+ s2)
where
a -/ a2- 4b
s1,s2 = 2
and Eqn. (A.17) will become:
C1 C2 C3011(s) = +_
s s + 1 + s52
where
PO
C1 = b
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C2
C3
( -s 1 ) ( - S 1 )
-S1 (S 2 - )
(p -s 2) ( - S2)
- s2(s 1 - 2)
Using the table of Inverse Laplace transform we will
get:
011(t) = C1 + C2 exp
The value of 11 (t) whe:
C1. Therefore:
() (O.)w -=.v
11) b
B) The case where a2- 4b =
(-st) + C3 exp(-s2t) (A.18)
n t becomes lare is equal to
0
In this case s1 and s2 will be equal and by using the
routine discussed earlier, 11 (t) will read:
{ll(t) = C1 + C2 exp(-slt) + C3t exp (-s1t) (A.19)
where
C = b
1 b
p + v- 2s1 C3
2 = -S 1 s
( - Sl)- ( -sl )
I3
a
s 1 = = 1 2 2
-S 1
21.1
C) The case where a2 - 4b <0 or 4b- a2 > 0
If the above situation is true then the Eqn.
(A.18) shall be factorized to:
C1 C2 s + C3
~ll(S) -s 2a 2+ 4b-a ][(s + ) +4
Using the table of Inverse Laplace Transform we get
a a2 C 3 C2 aZ
l1 1(t)= C1 +e 2[C 2 cos kt + 3- 2 sinkt] (A.20)
where
C 1 b
C2 1- C1
C3 (P+ v) - aC 1
k a=-4b 
A.2.2 2nd Order Erlangian Repair Time Density Function
In this case, g(t) has the following form:
g(t) = t exp(-pt)
and its Laplace transform is:
2
G(s) = (I+s ) (A.21)
Substituting for Gts), Ts), and Fs) from Eqns. (A.21),
(A.16) and (A.14) in Eqn. (A.13) and simplifying the resultant
equation we get:
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2
( + s) ( + s)
s[s3 + as 2 + bs+ c]
a = A+ v+ 2- P 3P 1 X
b = s(X +v)p+ ) + 2 + v- P 3P 1
c = (v+ X) p2+ 2ivX- P 3P 1X
(2 + v)
(2pv- p2) - P4Xp 2
To factorize the denominator we have to find its roots. One
method is to reduce the denominator to a manageable third
order equation. If we substitute x- for s, the denominator
will reduce to:
Den = s[x3 + px + q] (A.23)
where
a3
= - + b-
q = 2( -)3 ab + 
3 3
Then the roots of the bracket term will be
[x 1 ,x2 ,x 3 ] = [D+ E, - D l+2 /-- ]
where
D 3/ /q
,,1(S) -
where
(A.22)
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3-
E 2  
Q = ( P )3 ( q )2
Depending on the value of Q the roots will be changed from
the mixture of real and complex to three real roots. Hence
we have three distinct situations to evaluate the 1ll(t).
A) The case where Q> 0
This case will result in one real root and two com-
plex conjugate roots. By factorizing the Eqn. (A.23)
and taking into account that only one root of Eqn.
(A.23) should be positive, the Eqn. (A.22) will be
factorized to:
C1 C2 C3 s +C 4
11(s) s + y+ (A.24)s +y (s + )2 + w
where
Y = 3 (D+ E)
Z a + D+E
2-3 + 2
2 3 ( D- E 2
T3 2 
Equating the right sides of Eqns. (A.24) and (A.22)
will result in the values of C1 to C4
1_ 2v
C =e1 e
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C2
d2 - y(d1 - y) - d3/y
( z )2 +w2 -y(Z- y)z 
C3 = 1 - (C1 + C2)
C4 dl- yC 3 - ZC 2 - (Z + y)C 1
dl = 2p + v
d = ( + 2v)
2
dx = 1. v
Knowing the value of C1 to c4
can be calcu-
lated from:
11 (t) = C1 + C 2 exp(-yt) + exp
ZC4 -C 3 2+ sin(IwlIt)]
w
(A.25)
B) The case where Q= 0
This case will result in two real distinct roots.
When Q= 0, then D= E, Eqn. (A.22) can be written as:
C1 C2
= s+ a 2D
3
+
C3
(s + + D)2
C4
(s+ a+ D)
3
The constants can be calculated from the following
equations:
2
C = b F
(- t)[C3 cos(Iwlt)
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a 2 a(p- a3+ 2D) (p- + 2D)
a 2 a(2- 3)(3D)
1- a D)2 (v- a D)
( a+ D)(3D)
+
- D)2 + 2(- a- D)(v- - D)
( + D) (3D)
( + 4D)C 3
( + D) (3D)
Knowing C1 to C4, 11 (t) can be calculated from
ll 1 (t) = C1 + C2 exp(-(3 -2D) t) + C3t+ 3z 3x(C
+ C4 exp(-( + D)t)
C) The case where Q <0
This case will result in three different real roots.
Therefore, Eqr
C
(s ) = s +
where
a
s 1 = 3-
s = +2 3
S= a+3 3
n. (A.22) can be written
C2 +
s + s1
2 /-3
/-'P2 3
2 /3
C3
s+ s 2
cos
cos ( + )
0 3r
cos(3 
C2 =
C 3 =
C4
(A.26)
as:
C4
S + s 3
exp(- + ) t)
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O= cos -1 -q/2 
_ j
2
C -
(1- s 1) ( - SI)
C2 -Sl(S2 - Sl)(S3 - S
2
and finally the 4ll(t) ill read
11( ) C1 + C2 exp(-slt) + C3 exp(-s3t)
+ C4 exp(-s4t) (A.27)
A.2.3 Log-normal Repair Time Density Function
Here, we proposed to replace the log-normal distribution
with a combination of exponentials. To do so, we approximate
the log-normal with the following equation:
g(t) = A[exp(-Xlt) - exp(-X2t)] (A.28)
It was found out that the above equation will result in a good
approximation for small tail log-normal, and a conservative
value for long tail log-normal distribution. The above
results can be seen in Table A.1 to A.3. To find the
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Table A.1: COMPARISON OF CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION OF A LOG-NORMAL WITH
p= 3.0445 AND = 0.57 WITH ITS
APPROXIMATED COMBINATION OF EXPO-
NENTIALS WITH X = 6.319x 102 AND2l11 -1
X2 = 1.1263x 10
Cumulative Value (%)
Log-normal
6.OE-01
9.68E
46.6
73.4
87.1
93.6
96.7
98.2
99.0
99.45
99.70
99.81
99.98
99.98
99.99
Approx. Exponential
6.68
20.3
49.0
70.1
83.2
90.8
95.0
97.3
98.6
99.23
99.60
99.78
99.99
99.99
100.00
Time
Hour
5
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
160
180
I
I
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Table A.2: COMPARISON OF THE CUMULATIVE
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF
A LOG-NORMAL WITH p = 3.0445
AND a= 0.2, WITH ITS APPROX-
IMATED COMBINATION OF EXPO-
-2
NENTIALS, WITH X1 = 8.1783x 10
AND X2 = 1.0873x 101
2
Time Cumulative Value (%)
Hour Log-normal Approx. Exponential
1 0.0 0.417
5 0.00 8.15
10 0.01 24.2
15 4.63 41.1
20 40.4 55.9
25 80.8 67.8
30 96.27 76.93
35 99.46 83.70
40 99.94 88.6
45 99.99 91.8
50 100.00 94.56
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Table A.3: COMPARISON OF THE CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION OF A LOG-NORMAL, WITH
p= 4.60517 and a= 0.66785, WITH ITS
APPROXIMATED COMBINATION OF EXPONEN-
-2
TIALS, WITH Al= 1.0788x 10 AND
3.095x 10-2
k2 = 3.0955x 10
Cumulative Value (%)
Log-normal
~~~~. .-..
0.00
0.03
0.82
8.5
22.21
36.92
50.00
60.76
75.90
85.01
95.00
98.90
99.20
99.63
99.82
99.91
99.95
Approx. Exponential
0.3896
1.456
5.1
15.8
28.0
39.74
50.20
59.24
93.10
82.40
93.97
98.93
99.30
99.76
99.92
99.97
99.99
e
r
I
Tim
Hou
5
10
20
40
60
80
10.0
120
160
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
:
.-
.
..
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parameters used in Eqn. (A.28), the following properties of
the two distributions (log-normal and Eqn. (A.28)) will be
equated:
1) Mean values
2) Median values
To clarify the method, we present the following example.
Let us assume that we want to find the approximate distribu-
tion of a log-normal (i.e., to find the parameters of Eqn.
(A.28)) with the following properties:
·p= 3.0445
a= 0.57
First step is to find the parameter A. The parameter A can be
found by normalizing Eqn. (A.28), i.e., JO g(t)= 1, and
is:
1 2
A X -A (A.29)
2 1
The above normalization is necessary because for g(t) to be
a probability density function its area over all possible
values of t should be equal to one.
The mean value of Eqn. (A.28) is given by:
' f0rX %2 + X11=ot g(t) (A.30)
The median value of the Eqn. (A.28) is a time where the
following equation is true:
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tm
0
g(t) = 0.5 (A.31)
Now if we replace for p1 and tm from the properties of
log-normal distribution we will have:
tm e
m1 -
the
= e' - (A.32)
By substituting 1 and tm from Eqn. (A.32) in Eqns. (A.30 and
(A.31) and simplifying the resultant equations, we will get
the following correlation:
ax exp(- ) - exp(-ax) =0.5(x - 1)exp(a)x (A.33)
where
tm
a 
X2
x = .1
I
Equation (A.33) can only be solved by numerical itera-
tion. To do so, we simplify the above equation further. We
can expand the first exponential term to its third or fifth
terms of its series, i.e.:
a + a a 2 1 a 3
exp(- .) 1- 2 ~- 3 -T- ()
+ ( a) +... (A.33a)4! x A3a
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By using the properties of log-normal and the first three
terms of the Eqn. (A.33a), Eqn. (A.33) can be put into the
following form:
x1 [ -ax + + 0.5e a - a] (A.34)
0.5ea - 1
where
a - 0.85
One method of solving such an equation as Eqn. (A.34) is to
assume a number for, say x0, and find the RMS value of the
equation and repeat this action twice. Then find the new
adjusted value for x 0 from the following equation (See
Appendix A.3):
1 (X2 - Xl)2
x1 X+ 2X -x 2 (A.35)x 2 2x1 -x0 - x 2
If we repeat the above procedure long enough, the value of
x0 will approach the actual root value of the equation. The
routine discussed above was used to find the value of x in
Eqn. (A.34). It was found out that x has a value of 1.782471
and A1 and 2 were calculated to be:
X2 = 1.12634 x 10
1 = 6.31899x 10 2
To check the accuracy of the above results, the cumula-
tive distribution value of g(t) for the median point of
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log-normal distribution was calculated from the following
equation:
Pr(t< e) = f g(t) = 0.485
The above result shows that the matched distribution is a
good approximation to the original distribution. However,
if the first five terms of the Eqn. (A.33a) were being used
(instead of the first three terms), the resultant probability
at t= ell would be 0.4928. HIere, the difference is less than
one percent with the actual probability of the original
distribution, which again shows the consistency between the
distributions.
Having found the X1 and X2 parameters, one can easily
find the 11 (t) from the previous repair distribution (2nd
order Erlangian). Because the Laplace transform of g(t) is:
1 2
G(s) (A1 s)(X2 s) (A.36)
and can be replaced for Eqn. (A.21) by considering different
values for . Hence, the parameters a, b and c in the Eqn.
(A.22) for matched log-normal will read:
a = + + A1 + A2 - P3P1A
b = (X + )(X1 + A2) + 1X2 + vX - P3PlX(Xl+ 2 + v)
c = (V + A) (X1 2 ) + (A1 + 2 )VA - P3P1 ( 1 v + A2 v + X1 A2 )
- P4 A1A2 (A.37)
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And the procedure to find ll(t) will be the same as the
one which was discussed in the previous section (whereever we
have p2 and 2 we will replace them by X1X2 and (X1 + X2)
respectively).
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A.3 Solution of Equations of the Form x = f(x)
In certain cases when the equation can be formed as
x= f(x), where f is a known function of x, there is a partic-
ularly efficient way of proceeding to the solution.
Let, x = i be the root of the above equation; i.e.,
= f(5) (A.38)
Let, x be an initial trial value for the root § and
define xl= f(xo). And suppose that x is related to exact
root by:
x0 = + (A.39)
Then,
x l f(xo) = f( + e)+f( )+ f (+)+ 0(2)
or
2
xl = + f () + O(CE ) (A.40)
Now, let x denote the next initial value to use, and define
it as a linear combination of the first initial trial value
xo and derived value xl.
x0o Ax + Bx1 (A.41)
However, by substituting for x and x1 from Eqns. (A.39) and
(A.40) in Eqn. (A.41) we get:
2262xo =( + s+( ( +O 2Xo=A( +) +B( +ef ()+O(E ))
x0= (A+ B) + (A+ Bf ()) + O( 2) (A.42)
Since we wish x to be as close to the root as possible, we
set
A + B = 1
A + Bf ( ) =
(A.43)
(A.44)0
Solving Eqns. (A.43) and (A.44) for A and B:
1
B = t1
1- f ()
A =1 -B (A.45
The derivative f () is not known, however, but it can be
approximated by, say, f (Xo). To avoid differentiating f(x),
we can define x2 = f(xl), then in turn approximate f (Xo) by
x2 - x1
x -x o
Using this expression together with Eqn. (A.45) in Eqn. (A.41),
we will obtain,
(x1 -x 2 )
= x 2 +2x - x ° x 2 (A.46)
and
2
, x1 - x X2
o 2x1 - x - x2
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Thus, x can be used as a new initial trial value and the
process repeated. Convergence is usually very rapid, since
the error for each successive trial value is O(ec), when the
error for the previous trial value is . However, if f () = 1,
the process if it converges at all, converges more slowly,
since from Eqn. (A.44) we cannot then make both A+ B= 1 and
error of order vanish also.*
This result is known as Aitken's 62 process (See F.B.
Hildebrand, Introduction to Numerical Analysis, New York:
McGraw Hill C. (1956), p.445).
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APPENDIX B
SOME BASIC BACKGROUND AND REIATED
EXAMPLES USED IN SECTION 3.1
B.1 Mathematical Background for Boolean Operation
Let A, B, C denote sets or collections of sample points
in the sample space S. Associated with the event "A occurs"
in the event "A does not occur" which is denoted by X, called
complement of event A, i.e., the sample points of S not
contained in A. To symbolize "x (any point) is contained in
A," we use x A. However, when we say "the event A is con-
tained in the event B," we use ACB, and we mean "the occur-
rence of event A implies the occurrence of event B."
There are two fundamental operations that have had wide
application in fault tree analysis; they are union (U) or OR
and intersection () or AND operations. The event AUB is
called the union of A and B, or the event "either A or B (or
both) occur." This is equivalent to saying that if xe A or
x e B (or both), then x AUB, or in closed forni we can write:
AUB = {x| xeA or xeB} (B.1)
The event AnB is called the intersection of A and B, or
the event "both A and B occur." And in closed form is
AfB = {xJ xeA and x B
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Two sets are disjointed or mutually exclusive if they have no
common elements, thus the intersection of two disjoint sets
is the null set. This will be written symbolically as
AtB = +
The operation between sets or events can be represented
using a venn diagram which displays a subset of S as in
Fig. B.l. Figure B.1 shows four disjoint sets that form S.
And there exist 16 unique subsets which can be produced by
all the possible union combinations of the sets 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Table B.1 shows the operation between the two sets A and B
and summarizes some of the Boolean operation laws. Figure B.1
can be used to check some of the operations mentioned in
Table B.1.
Fig. B.l: A general Venn diagram,
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TABLE B.I: LIST OF BOOLEAN OPERATIONS AND IDENTITIES
Property or Operation
1. (A) = A
2. AA = A
AUA - A
3. AnB = BOA
AUB = BUA
4. AU (AAB) =
A(l(BUA) =
A
A
5. AnB = AUB
AUB = AnB
6. AA = 
AUA = S
7. A(BUC) =
(AAB) U (A)C)
8. AU(BC) =
(AUB)CA(AUC)
9. (AB) U (A%)
(A%") U (AB)
Statement of the Operation
The complement of the comple-
ment of A is A itself (the
Involution Law),
The intersection/union of A
itself is A (the Idempotent
Law).
The cumulative law for
(intersection/union) of events.
The absorption law.
The dualization law or
(deMorgan's Law).
The complementary relations.
The first states that an
event and its complement can-
not occur. The second states
that an event or its comple-
ment must occur.
The distributive law of
intersection with respect to
union.
The distributive law of union
with respect to intersection.
Exclusive OR,
coincidence.
1
_ _
-
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B.2 Application of UNRAC to the Two Fault Tree Examples,
for Comparison with MODCUT and WAM-CUT
In this Appendix, the results of the minimal cut sets
generated by BIT are given. Figure B.2 shows a fault tree
diagram which is used in Modarres (1979). The corresponding
minimal cut sets are shown in Table B.2. The component's
numbers in Table B.2 are those assigned in the Figure B.2.
Fig. B.3 shows an example fault tree which is used to
compare the results of BIT with WAM-CUT (EPRI (1978)). The
fault tree is numbered according to the input descriptions to
UNRAC. As can be. seen, the combination gate is replaced by
four gates. Before inputing the tree, gate number 24 which
is a NOR gate should be transformed according to Figure 3.3
to AND gate with complemented input events. Table B.3 shows
all the minimal cut sets. In comparing to the results given
in EPRI(1978), one should note that Table B.3 gives all the
minimal cut sets whereas EPRI(1978) reported those cut sets
with probability value of 10-6 or more. Therefore, in Table
B.3, five more minimal cut sets are generated.
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Table B.2: LIST OF MINIMAL CUT SETS GENERATED
BY BIT FOR FIG. B.2
CUT SET NO. NO. OF CO'AP. IN C. S. COMPONENTS NOS.
1 3 1 2 3
2 3 1 2 4
3 4 1 2 5 16
4 4 1 2 13 17
5 4 1 2 15 19
6 4 1 2 8 20
7 4 1 2 10 21
8 4 1 2 18 23
9 4 1 2 18 25
10 4 1 2 10 26
11 4 1 2 22 28
12 4 1 2 22 24
13 4 1 2 22 23
14 4 1 2 22 29
15 4 1 2 22 30
16 4 1 2 35 36-
17 4 1 2 22 27
18 5 1 2 18 33 34
19 5 1 2 22 31 32
20 5 1 2 12 13 35
21 5 1 2 7 8 36
22 5 1 2 9 10 36
23 5 1 2 14 15 35
24 5 1 2 5 6 36
25 5 1 2 11 23 37
26 5 1 2 11 28 36
27 5 1 2 11 24 36
28 5 2 11 23 36
29 5 1 2 11 29 36
30 5 1 2 11 30 36
31 5 1 2 23 35 37
32 5 1 2 25 35 37
33 5 1 2 26 35 37
34 5 1 2 11 27 36
35 6 1 2 11 12 13 28
36 6 1 2 11 12 13 24
37 6 1 2 11 12 13 23
38 6 1 2 11 12 13 29
39 6 t 2 1 112 13 30
40 6 1 2 33 34 35 37
41 6 1 2 5 6 23 37
42 6 1 2 5 6 25 37
43 6 1 2 5 6 26 37
44 6 1 2 5 6 12 13
45 6 1 2 7 8 23 37
46 6 1 2 7 8 25 37
47 6 1 2 7 8 26 37
48 6 1 2 9 10 23 37
49 6 1 2 9 10 25 37
50 6 1 2 9 10 26 37
51 6 1 2 11 14 15 28
52 6 1 2 11 14 15 24
53 6 1 2 11 14 15 23
54 6 1 2 11 14 15 29
55 6 1 2 11 14 15 30
56 6 1 2 5 6 14 15
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Table B.2 Continued
CUT SET NO. NO. OF COMP. IN C. S COMPONENTS NOS.
57 6 1 2 11 24 26 37
58 6 1 2 7 8 14 15
59 6 1 2 7 8 12 13
60 6 1 2 9 10 14 15'
61 6 1 2 11 12 13 27
62 6 1 2 9 10 12 13
63 6 1 2-11 14 15 27
64 6 1 211 24 25 37
65 6 1 2 11 25 28 37
66 6 i 2 11 26 28 37
67 6 t 2 11 25 29 37
68 6 1 211 25 30 37
69 6 1 2 11 26 29 37
70 6 1 2 11 26 30 37
71 6 1 2 11 31 32 36
72 6 1 2 11 25 27 37
73 6 1 2 11 26 27 37
74 7 1 2 11 26 31 32 37
75 7 1 2 1t 29 33 34 37
76 7 1 2 11 30 33 34 37
77 7 1 2 11 28 33 34 37
78 7 1 2 If 27 33 34 37
79 7 1 2 7 8 33 34 37
80 7 1 211 24 33 34 37
81 7 1 2 5 6 33 34 37
82 7 1 2 9 10 33 34 37
83 7 1 2 11 12 13 31 32
84 7 1 2 11 25 31 32 37
85 7 1 2 11 14 15 31 32
86 8 1 2 11 31 32 33 34 37
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Table B.3: LIST OF MINIMAL CUT SETS GENERATED
BY BIT FOR FIG. B.3
CUT SET NO. NO. OF COUP. IN C. S.
1 2
2 .1
3 2
4 3
5 2
6 2
7 3
8
9
10
11
t2
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25'
2
3
3
4
2
4
3
4
2
2
3
2
4
2
4
2
3
2
COMPONENTS NOS.
1 4
11
1 8
4 8 9
2 4
3 4
1 -3 6
5
2 8 93 8 9
1 -3 -6 10
1 7
-3 6 b 95 8 9
-3 4 -8 10
4 7
5 7
2 -3 6
2 5
-3 5 -6 10
3 5
2 -3 -6 10
2 7
-3 6 7
3 7
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B.3 On the Evaluation of the Equivalent Component's
Parameters
In Section 3.2.2, it was mentioned that to decrease CPU
time for the cut set generation and improve the efficiency of
the code it is advisable to combine some of the non-repetitive
components and represent them as a super event or equivalent
component when the top event unavailability computation is
the desired goal. The above procedure is applicable to
components with constant unavailablity and those which can be
repaired upon the inception of failure (monitored components).
The equivalent component parameters are highly dependent
on the type of the gate that the combined components will be
input to. Here, we will only consider the OR and AND gate.
The equations that will be summarized in this appendix
are taken from a report published by Ross (1975). In that
report the asymtotic expected down time and up time of a
series and a parallel system of repairable components was
analyzed. Table B.4 shows the final equations for equiva-
lent failure rate, X, and repair rate, , of an AND and OR
gate. This table was produced by some manipulation of the
results given in Ross (1975). In another study, Modarres
(1979), an approximated set of equations to evaluate the
equivalent X and p was reported. For proof the readers will
be referred to the above references.
#.E 
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TABLE B.4: EQUIVALENT FAILURE AND REPAIR RATE OF AN
AND/OR GATE, FOR MONITORED COMPONENTS AND
ELPURENTS WITH CONSTANT UNAVAILABILITY
x is a set of n number of components input to the gate.
Ai is the constant unavailability of component i.
Xi,Pi are the failure and repair rates of the component i.
Gate Type Equivalent Parameter Gate Output
for Constant
A p Unavailability
AND
1-
iEX E iEX i i iE 
OR
ix Pi+Xi
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APPENDIX C
ON THE CODE STRUCTURE AND INPUT DESCRIPTION TO UNRAC
C.1 Code Structure
The UNRAC consists of three parts. The first part is the cut set
generator which reads in the fault tree description and generates the
minimal cut sets. The second part is the unreliability and/or unavail-
ability evaluator which reads in the component's data, i.e., failure rate,
test interval, average test time, average repair times etc., and calculate
the top event unavailability and importance of each component involved.
Finally, the third part is the Monte-Carlo simulator which reads in the
error factor and distribution of each component's failure characteristics,
i.e., failure rate, average test time, etc., and simulates the top event
distribution to find the error bound on the top event unavailability.
Figure C.1 shows the structure of UNRAC discussed above and its related
subroutines. The function of each subroutine is described as follows:
1-FLOGIC Reads in the fault tree, generates the cut: sets, and ranks
(optional) the minimal cut sets in order of their size. It
calls 3 subroutines; a) MCSN1, b) MCSN2, and c) DECOD. MCSN1
and MCSN2 are used to discard the super sets and duplicated
sets and DECOD is used to transfonr the cut set words into
the individual components in each cut set.
2-C(MDAT Reads in the component's data, checks for any misarrangements
in input sequence and prints out the component's input param-
eters.
3-QCAUN Evaluates the average unavailability of each component over
a period of one year. It calls two subroutines; a) MONTOR
and b) EXAGAM. IMNTOR, first sets up proper efficients for
the monitored components, and then calls SOLN to find the
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MCSN1
-CUT SET (BIT)-FLOGIC - MCSN2
GENERATOR - DECOD
f.rnRn A MT _N rrnn CeT M
UNAVAIL-
- ABILITY -
EVALUATOR
- MONTE - CARLO
SIMULATOR
I,.A.lvl~J
- QCAUN EXAGAM
- TIMES rTEXGAM-QUAV
- CIMPOR QCPONT-SOLNT
LSYCOm TEXGAM-QUNAV
Ls~sccxm
- AVERAG
- QPRINT
- QPLOT - GRAPII - ENDPLT
SYSCC( RAND
- MCSIM L XVART - ANRAND
GAMARN
EXPRN
Fig. C.1 : The general routines used in UNRAC
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coefficients of the monitored component's unavailability
equations and evaluate the average unavailability of each
monitored component over a period of one year. EXAGAM is used
when the repair distribution of a periodically tested component
is exponential and/or special gamma (2nd order erlangian)
at the end QCAUN prints the average unavailabilities.
4-TIMES generates all the time points required for the time dependent
analysis used in the following routines.
5-CIMPOR Computes the importance of each component based on, either
the average values calculated in QCAUN routine or any
specified time during the operations it calls QCPONT which
will be discussed in the following routine.
6-QCOMP Calculates the top event unavailabilities of the system based
on time points generated by TIMES routine. It calls QCPONT
and SYSCh. QCPONT calculates the time dependent unavail-
ability of each component and SYSCCM evaluates the top event
unavailability of each component and SYSCOM evaluates the
top even unavailability given components unavailabilities.
QCPONT calls SOLNT and TXGAM depending upon the type of
component under study. If it is a monitored'SLNT will be
called if it is a periodically tested component TEXGAM
will be called.
7-AVERAG Finds the average top event unavailabilty.
8-QPRINT Prints the top events unavailabilities at peaks and detailed
time dependent for the requested time intervals.
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9-QPLOT Plots the top event unavailabilities for the requested type
and intervals.
10-MCSIM Simulates the top event distributions. It calls XVART and
SYSCOM. XVART first simulates each component's failure
characteristics according to its distribution by bnte-Carlo
sampling. Then finds the each component's unavailability.
XVART calls several random number generators i.e., RAND
(unifomn), GARAN (Gamma), ANRAND (normal) and EXPRN
(exponential).
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C.2 On the Random Nuifber Generator and Sorting Routine Used in the
'bnte-Carlo Sl'at MCSIM
MCSIM is able to simulate different distributions for the component's
failure characteristics. In general, all of the distributions in use
today can be simulated by using a combination of uniform, exponential
and normal random number generators, see McGrath, et al (1975). For
uniform random number generator, the general residual value routine for
IBM was employed (cf. Section 3.4.2). To generate the exponential and
normal variates the routines of Maclaren, et al (1964) and Marsaglia and
Bray (1964) were used. Figures C.2 and C.3 show the flow charts of
exponential and normal random numnber generator.
To rank the top event unavailabilities in order of their magnetude,
a sorting routine which was used in LIMITS was incorporated in the MCSIM.
Figure C.4 shows the flow chart of the aforementioned routine.
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Fig. C.2: Exponential distribution random number
generator flow diagram
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No Yes
Note: NRAND = Number of random numbers to be sorted
P (I) = Numbers to be sorted
'Fig. C.4: Flow chart of sorting routine used in MICSIM.
PROB = P(I)
P(I) - P(I+M)
P I+M) PROB
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C.3 INPUT Description of UNRAC
The UNRAC is written in such a way that it can be used to run one or
more cases by inputing the proper sets of data. Each data set of input
is called "Data Group". Each data group begins with a keyword card which
identifies the data and one or more additional cards containing proper
information for that data group. A case consists of 3 data groups:
1) Fault tree logic
2) Component data.
3) Output option.
However, there are a total of 10 data groups needed to run a complete job
(demanding all the options encoded ). The 10 data groups are described
below.
. Data Group #1 -- TITLE
This data group specifies the title for the case to be run. It con-
sists of two-card types. The first card type is a keyword card containing
the characteristics "TITL" in the first 4 columns. The second card type
contains 80 'characters of text to be used for the output heading. The
corresponding variables name and required formats for this data group
are:
Card Variable
Type # Columns Name Format Description
1 1 - 4 ANAE (A 4) Keyword 'TITL"
2 1 - 80 TITLE 1 (20 A 4) Title for output
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2 Data Group #2 -- LOGIC (Fault tree logic)
This data group describes the logic of fault tree to be analyzed. It
is identified by a keyword card beginning with the characters "LOGIC".
To input the fault tree logic, all the basic events and gates should be
numbered in order to minimize the storage requirement. Hence, the follow-
ing procedures should be employed.
1) First assign a number to each basic event (start from 1). For
complement events use the negative number of the corresponding events,
(i.e., if there exist both A and A in a fault tree and the number N
has already been assigned to A then -N should be assigned to A).
2) Then assign a number to the top gate, and
3) Continue until all the gates are being numbered.
The variable names and the required formats for this group are
Card Variable
Type # Column Name Format Description
1 1 - 4 ANAME (A 4) Keyword "LOGI"
2 1 - 3 IMAX (I1, Total number of components
4 - 6 IMAXT
7-9 LMAX
10 - 12 NSORT
13 - 15 NMAX
1- L1(I,J)
in the fault tree
I3, Total number of components
plus gates in the fault tree
13 Maximum No. of input to a
gate plus two. Presently
LMAX Limit is 20.
I3, A control card for minimal
eut sets printout,
If NSORT=1 no need for sort-
ing the min. cut sets.
If NSORT=0 order the min.
cut sets according to their
size.
I3) Maximum allowable components
per cut set.
(2413) Gate Information card(s)
Each card starts with the
3
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gate number assigned in the
fault tree, gate type (1 for
AND 0 for OR) and gate input
in any order (components
and/or gates).
NOTE: The total number of card type #3 should be equal to IMAXT-IMAX,
and the cards should be arranged in a sequential order of the gate
numbers starting from the top gate.
3 Data Group #3 -- CCMPONENTS
This data group describes the components which make up the system
to be evaluated. It is identified by a keyword card beginning with the
characters "COMP". This card is followed by an option card containing
the characters "NEW or "UPDATED". The characters "NEW" indicates that
the components to be input are to become the effective component set
for the case replacing previously input components (i:f any). "UPDATED"
indicates that only the non-blank components parameters are to be used
in updating corresponding parameters for previously input components.
After the '"NEI' or "UPDATED" card, one card must be entered for each
component. This card contains the component number, component name, and
11 parameters describing the reliability data for the component. Zero
entries may be left blank.
Under the "NEW' option the component number should be sequential,
starting with one. Under the '"UPDATED" option, the component numbers are
used as keys to identify components to be updated and non-blank fields on
the following component cards replace the old values for the correspond-
ing parameters. A negative number must be used to zero out a parameter.
The 11 parameters on the component cards are:
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Symbol Name Description
A LAMDA Failure rate (hr"1) x 106
T2' TEST2 Periodic test interval (days)
T1 TEST1 First test interval (days)
Tc TAU Average test period (hours)
TR REPAIR Average repair time or mean-time-to-repair (hours)
qo QAVRD Test override unavailability
Pf PTCF Probability of test - caused failure
e INEFF Detection inefficiency
Au ULAMDA Undetected failure rate (hr )x10 6
qd QRESID Constant unavailability per demand
DIST Repair distribution
If 0 is input as a non-zero value, the program will recompute X as
follows: A1 = A(l-e).
If is input and Au is left blank, the program will compute Au as
Xu = X.
The 11 parameters described above allow the user to specify mst
types of components under a variety of testing schemes:
-- for non-maintained components. The user must provide a non-
zero value for u and/or qd and the rest of the parameters should
be left blank.
-- for periodically tested components. The user must input a non-
zero value for x and T2 and optional values for T1, T TR, q,
pf , e, u qd and repair distribution type.
-- for monitored components and TR are essential input and T1 and
T2 should be zero or left blank. If a three state component
model is being used then a non-zero value for qo and pf is required.
A non-zero value for qo refers to the probability that the
component does not have any indication for its failure [i.e.,
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P3=qo in equation (3.1)]. And a non-zero value for pf indicates
the probability that the failure is a spurious one (i.e., pl=pf
in equation (3;1).
To specify the repair distribution, the following initials should be
used:
1) E for exponential
2) u for uniform and/or constant
3) G, for gamma and/or 2nd order erlangian
4) M, for lognormal approximated by the combination of exponential.
The data requirement for the case of 1 to 3 are self-explanatory, i.e.,
TR is sufficient to express the distribution. For the fourth distribution
two parameters are needed see equation (3.8)]o. They are:
TR l/l
'u-X'2
Finally, the last card of the components data should contain "-1" in the
component numbers field to end the data group. The CMPONEflS data
group variable names and their formats are shown below:
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Card
Type #
1
2
3
Colum
1- 4
1- 4
1- 5
6-13
14-19
20-25
26-31
32-37
38-43
44-49
50-55
56-61
62-67
68-77
79
NOTE: There should
of card type
Variable
name
ANAME
TYPE
INDX
NAME
LAA
TEST2
TEST].
TAU
REPAIR
QOVRD
PTLF
IWEFF
ULAMDA
QRESID
DIST
be a total of
3. Otherwise
Format Description
(A 4)
(A 4)
(I 5,
A 8,
F 6.0,
F 6.0,
F 6.02
F 6.0,
F 6.0,
F 6.0,
F 6.0,
F 6.0,
F 6.0,
E10. 3,
IX,
Al)
Keyword "CIP"
Option "NEW" or WJPDTrt'
Component number
Component name
Failure rate x 106/hr.
Test interval (days)
First test nterval (days)
Average test time (ur)
Average repair time (hour)
Override unavailability
Test-caused failure
Detect ion inefficiency
Undetected failure ratex106/hr
Constant tinavailability
Repair distribution
IMAX (total number of the components)
the unavailability calculations based.
on the fault tree input will not be correct. To decrease the time
interval between two output results, it is recommended to use a
dummy component card. The number for dummy component should be
IMAX + 1 and the name should be "DJ!LvY" punched in columns 6-10.
The value for should be zero and the value for T2 should be the
desired interval, say 2 days. After the dummy the termination
card should be used, i.e., Code "-1" in columns 4 and 5 of the last
card.
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4 Data Group #4 - -TIME (Optional)
This data group specifies the time period over which component and
system unavailability are to be computed. It consists of a keyword card
beginning with the characters '"TIME" followed by a single card containing
the total time (in days) over which the time dependent, instantaneous
unavailability is to be computed.
The number of time points generated by the code with:in the time period
is a function of the test intervals, testing times, andl repair tines of
the components. A pair of points is generated where-ever a change in the
slope of any component unavailability function occurs.
If the data groups(inCluding the keyword card) is omitted or if a
zero is entered for the "time period", the default value of 365 days will
be considered by the code. The time data group variable names and their
formats are shown below
Card Variable
Type Column Name Format Description
1 1- 4 ANAIE (A 4) Keyword "TIME."
2 1-10 TEND (F10.0) Total time period (days)
5 Data Group #5 -- IMPORTANCE (Optional)
This data group is used to request the importance evaluation of a
specified set of components or all of the components towards the top
event based on either the average unavailability or instantaneous unavail-
ability of the components in the system. The data set is identified by a
keyword card beginning with the characters "IMPO". This card is followed
by an option card containing the characters "ALL" or "SPECIFIC". "ALL" is
used if the calculation of importance of all of the components are desired.
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"SPECIFIC' option is used when one or more components of the system have
either failed or become inactive in one way or another and it is desired
to evaluate the importance of the rest of the components involved.
The third card in this data group should contain the time that the
importance calculations must be carried out. This time should be a non-
zero value for the "SPECIFIC' case. However, for the "ALL" case the time
card can be a blank card. If the blank card is used, the importance
calculation will be carried out based on the average unavailability of
each component evaluated over a period of one year. For "ALL" case, the
time card is the last card in this data set.
In the case of "SPECIFIC' option a total of 5 cards are needed. The
fourth card should contain the specified component number which will be
assumed to be in failed state or under the test. Finally, the fifth card
should contain a list of dependent or inactive components. The IMPORTANCE
data group variable names and their formats are shown in the following
table:
Card
Type # "Columns
1 1- 4
2 1- 4
3 1-10
IF TYPE = ALL,
4 1- 3
4- 6
5 1-
Variable
Name Format Description
ANAE (A 4) Keyword "IMPO"
TYPE (A 4) Optional "ALL" or "SPEC"
TIMPOT (E10.3) Time of importance analysis(hr)
Then GO TO card data group 6, Otherwise:
IM(X4PQ (13, Specific component's
number to be out of service
IDEP I3) Total NO. of dependent
component to be read in
next card.
IRELCM(K) (20 I 3) Component's numbers depend-
Ks=, DEP dnt on IMCcMP
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6 Data Group #6 -- 'PRINT (Optional)
This data set is used to request a table printout of the system
unavailabilities computed by the program over one or more time intervals
(within the input time period) and to specify the number of instaneous
unavailabilities to be separately ranked. The data group is identified
by a keyword card beginning with the characters "PRIN". The keyword card
must be followed by one card containing the number of time intervals
desired and the number of maximum unavailabilities desired. The value
input for the number of intervals may be -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4.
If the value input is negative, all. system urlavailabilities computed
are printed,no additional cards are necessary. If the value is zero,
any print options previously specified are nullified tlid the default
option (no print) is instituted no addition cards are necessary. If the
value is greater than zero, another card containing the end points of the
intervals is read, in this case the program will print the
system unavailability at all the computed time points that .fall within
the specified interval(s) including the end points. A maxinmumn of four
intervals may be specified.
The maximnan unavailability output lists, in decreasing order, the n
greatest instantaneous unavailabilities computed by the program. The
number of unavailabilities printed (n) has a default value of 12 and may
not exceed 100. If the PRINT data set (including the keyword card) is
omitted, 12 peaks are printed, and no other system unavailability print-
out is produced.
The PRINT data group variables name and the required formats are:
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Card
Type #
1
2
Columns
1- 4
1- 5
6-10
IF NPRINT < 0
3 1-80
Variable
Name
ANAME
NPRINT
NPEAK
Forma
(A 4)
(I 5,
I 5)
GO TO next data grou
(STPPT(I),
FINPRT(2), (8F10
I=l, 4)
Description
Keyword "PRIN"
NO. of time intervals
for printing system un-
availabilities (-1,0, or
1-4).
NO. of peaks to be printed,
default is 12.
p, otheri.se:
Start of Ith interval
(Days)
.D) End of Ith interval
(Days)
Max. of 4 intervals
7 Data Group #7 -- PLOT (Optional)
This data set is used to specify the time intervals used for plot-
ting the system unavailability. It is idetified by a keyword card
beginning with characters PLOT'. The keyword card rfst be followed by a
card containing the number of intervals.
If the number of intervals is negative, the plot interval is set to
the total time period over which points are computed and no additional
cards are necessary. If this value is zero, any plot interval previously
input are nullified and the default plot interval is instituted. The
default interval is given by;
max (Tli + 2 T2i + Tci + TRi)
where Tli, T2i, Tci and TRi are the first test interval, second test
interval, mean test time and mean repair time of ith components respec-
tively. Thus the default interval is the three largest test cycles of
any component, which is often sufficient for establishing the system
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behavior.
If the default plot interval exceeds the total time period, then the
time period is used instead. If the number of intervals is greater
than zero, another card containing the beginning and the end points of
each interval is read. A maximum of four intervals may be specified.
Note that unlike the PRINT data set which actually activates the
system unavailability printout, the PLOT data set merely sets up the
plot intervals which are to be used. Plots must be 'requested in the RUN
(explained in the next data set) data set in order for graphical output
to be produced. If plots are requested in the RUN data set, but the PLOT
data set (including keyword card) is not input then the default interval
described above will be used. The following Table shows the variables
name and the required format for PLOT data group.
Card Variable
Type # Columns Name Format Description
1 1- 4 ANAME (A 4) Keyword "PLOT"
2 1- 5 NPLOT (I 5) NO. of time intervals for
plotting system unavail-
abilities, (-i,0 or 1-4).
IF NPLOT < 0 then GO to next data group; otherwise;
3 1-80 (STPLT(I), Start of Ith plot intervals
(Days)
FINPLT(I), End. of Ith plot intervals
(Days)
I=l, 4) (8F10.0) Max. of 4 intervals.
A_
A_
A_
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8 Data Group #8 -- RUN
This data set initiates the system unavailability calculations.
The TITLE, LOGIC, CCM(XENTS and optionally the TIME, IMPORTANCE, PRINT,
and PLOT parameters must be set up before the RUN data set. The RUN data
set is identified by a keyword card beginning with the characters '"RU'.
The "RUN" keyword card must be followed by one or more run data cards,
where each has the following parameters.
A -- Calculation accuracy number, number code identifying the number
of terms to be used in calculating the top event unavailability.
The number coded should be,
"1" if first term approximation (rare event approximation)
"3" if first 3 terms approximation.
"5" if first terms approximation.
is desired. For most evaluations use "1" because "3" and
"5' are usually time consuming.
B -- Unavailability option -- four letter code selecting the type
of unavailability to be computed where
"FAIL" means compute the instantaneous unavailability based
on contributions from component failures only (the
between tests contribution).
"TOTL" means compute the instantaneous unavailability based
on contributions from failures, testing and repair.
When the unavailability option is left blank, the default
value is 'TOTL".
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C -- PLOT requirement data
C.1 -- x-scale -- four letter code specifying the scaling of the
points along the x or time axis where
"NONE" means no plots are produced.
"LIN" means a linear scale is used for the time points.
'A" means that the time points are spaced at equal
intervals regardless of the actual elapsed time
between the points. This produces a plot in which
the test and repair contributions are magnified so
that the structure of the system unavailability
function is easier to see. Tho indices of the time
points are plotted along the X-axis.
'BOTH" means both "LIN"' and 'IMAG" scales are used. Two
plots are produced for each y-scale selected.
If x-scale is left blank, the default value is "LIM' when
the unavailability option is "FAIL", "BOTH" when the
option is "'TOL".
C.2 -- y-scale -- four letter code specifying the scaling of the
points along the y or system unavailability axis where
"NONE" means no plots are produced (may be omited if x-
scale = "NONE")
"'IN"' means a linear scale is used for the system una-
vailabilities.
"LOG" means a log scale is used for the system unavail-
abilities.
'BUIH" means both '"LIN" and "LOG" scales are used. Two
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plots are produced for each x-scale selected
(e.g., if x-scale = 'BOIH" and y-scale = '"Bl-I",
four plots are produced for each time interval
specified in the "PLOT" data group).
If y-scale is left blank, the default value is "LIN"' when
the unavailability option is "FAIL", "LOG" when the una-
vailability option is '"rOTL".
C.3 -- plot cutoff option - power of 10 to be used as a lower
bound on system unavailability for plotting (e.g.,
-7 = 10-7). The default is no cutoff.
C.4 -- plot title -- 56 character text to appear as a plot sub-
heading in addition to the title for the case.
A negative system number indicates the end of the RUN
data group. The RUN data group variables are:
Card Variable
Type # Columns Name Format Descrition
1 1- 4 ANAME (A 4) Keyword "RUN"
2 1- 3 NSYS (13, lx Calculation accuracy No.
5- 8 QOPT ,A4, lx Unavailability option
10-13 XOPT ,A4, lx x-scale
15-18 XOPT ,A4, x x-scale
20-23 ICUTO ,I4 lx Cutoff option
25-80 TITLEZ 14 A 4) Plot title
NOTE: This data group will terminate if a -1 is used for the
calculation accuracy number.
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9 Data Group #9 -- SIMULATION (Optional)
This data group is used to request the simulation of the top event
distribution using Monte-Carlo technique. The SIMULATION data group is
identified by a keyword card beginning with the characters "SIMU'. This
card must be followed by a card which requests the type of simulation
desired. The code can simulate the top event based on:
1) error bounds on the average unavailability of each component
(WASH 1400 type calculations) and is termed as "type 1 simula-
tiod';
2) error bounds on the component's failure characteristics, i.e.,
on failure Tate, average test time, average repair time, etc.,
and is termed as "type 2 simul.ation".
-- (This routine generates each components parameters distribu-
tion and then evaluates the average components unavailabilities
by random sampling from the generated parameters distributions.)
3) error bounds on the component's failure characteristics, but
evaluates the top event distribution at the specific time (s)
of operation. (Up to 5 different operational times, and is
termed as "type 3 simulation".
The third card type in this data group contains a number for Monte-Carlo
iteration, initial random number generator and the degree of accuracy of
the evaluation. The uniform random number generator used in this code is
the general IBM residual value routine. The general form of the random
number generator is:
xn+ ,= a xn(mod 2)
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where
p = 31 for IBM 370
a = initial random nuaber generator.
The fourth card type in this data group is for the component's failure
characteristics error factors and their respective distributions. Each
card carries information about two successive components (i.e., informa-
tion about comp. #i and i+l), The variables name and required format
used in this data group are:
Card Variable
Type # Columns `Name 'Format Description
1 1- 4 ANAME (A 4) Keyword "SInIP'
2 1- 3 NJMC (13) A control card to simu
1- 5 NRAND
6-20 IX
21-26 ACC
(I5,
115,
F6 .0)
1-80 (FA(I ,J), IDTS(I,J),
J,1,4),
(FA(I+1,J) ,DMS (I+1,J),
J=1,4)
[8(F9.0,A1)]
IF NJMC < 3GO TO next data group
(cont'd....)
late the type of results
desired I NJ31C 7
NJMC=1, type 1 simlation
NJMC=2, type 2 simulation
NJMC=3'-7, type 3 simula-
tion
Number of iteration for
Monte-Carlo simulation
Initial random number
generator.
Degree of accuracy on
the results, default is
0.5.
Error factors on the
Component 's
failure characteristics
data and their distribu-
tions. The parameters
are, failure rate, aver-
age test time, average
repair time and residual
constant unavailability.
otherwise;
3
4
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Card Variable
Type # Columns Name Format Description
5 1-50 IMC(I) (5E10.3) This card is needed if
NJMC 3. This card
should contain the time(s)
that the simulation should
be carried out (time is in
hours).
10 Data Group #10 -- END
This card terminates the computations. The card contains the
characters "END" in its first three columns. If more calculations are
required simply modify or add the desired parameters using the appropri-
ate data groups and by-pass the END card. It should be remembered that
once the fault tree is read in, there is no need to be input again if
the same system is being analyzed for all the subsequent cases. To get
the time dependent unavailabilities the RUN data grolup) shotld always
follow the changed cases.
When the "END" card is used the job will terminate and the code
will print "END OF CALCULATION BY UNRAC'. This statement signifies that
all the desired evaluations has completed successfully. Otherwise look
for misprinted and misplaced card(s).
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C.5 On The Input Sample Fault Tree
The first step in preparing the input data for UNRAC is
to number the fault tree components and/or gates. However,
if there exists any NAND, EOR or NOR gates in the fault tree
one has to transform them to the basic AND and OR gates accor-
ding to Fig. 3.3 before numbering the events and gates.
For the sample fault tree, the AFWS is chosen. The fault
tree diagram is given in Fig. 4.4. As can be seen, the fault
tree is numbered and there exists a total of 23 basic events
(components) and 10 gates (ie. IMAX=23 and IMAXT=23*10=33).
Table C.1 shows the input data which is prepared for the
analysis. In this analysis we requested the following infor-
mation.
1) Minimal cut sets of the fault tree to be printed
out in any order ie. NSORT-1).
2) All the component importance calculations to be
carried out based on the average unavailability
of each component (ie. TYPE=ALL and TIMPOT=(Blank)).
3) Average and instantaneous unavailabilities to be
calculated based on first term approximation (ie.
NSYS=1), 12 peaks and complete instantaneous un-
availabilities of the system between zero and 60
days to be printed out (ie. NPEAK=(Blank) and
NPRINT=1).
4) Top event simulation to be carried out based on the
error factor on the component's failure characteri-
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stics (ie. failure rate, average test time, average
repair time, etc.) and their assumed log-normal
distributions.
Table C.2 gives all the information requested. In sheet
one of Table C.2, there exist some useful information about
the completeness of the minimal cut set generator, ie., I is
the total of minimal cut sets and II is the number of times
cut set I is being replaced by I, (for further information
see Fig. 3.1). In sheet S of Table C.2, a note is printed
out to express the values of false failure and unrevealed
fault of a monitored component. In sheet 8 of Table C.2, the
top event unavailability based on the average components un-
availability is given. In sheet 14 of Table C.2, information
concerning the error bounds, median value, standard deviation,
third and fourth moments and the values of 1 and 2 (BETA I
and BETA 2) are reported. Finally, in sheet 15 the top event
cumulative probability distribution with their respective
accuracies are given.
NOTE: The CPU time option in the code is inactive, therefore,
please disregard the 0 time consumption for the cut set gen-
eration.
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Table C.l: LIST OF INPUT TO UNRAC FOR THE SAMPLE PROBLEM
TITLE
AUX. FEED WATER RELIABILITY ANALYSIS.
LOGIC
23 33 8 1 30
24 .0 1 25 28
25 1 28 27
26 0 2 3
27 0 4 5
28 1 29 30
29 0 7 6 9 8 10
30 0 11 12 31
31 1 32 33
32 0 13 14 15 16 17 19
0 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 SINS. F
2 CV 133
3 CV 131
4 CV 136
5 CV 138
6 CV. TE
MV. TUR .3
8 TURP.MP 30.
9 NO STEM
1053 2 F .1,
11BLD FLD
12C. Pi;R F
13CONVPI 5.1
14 NOPWR2
15 VP'ilP1 .3
16CV. EP2
17 PMP 2 30.
18P,'P 1 30.
19OPER FLT
2C0CV.EP1
21MVPM Pl .3
22NOPWRI
23CONVP1 5.1
24DUMMY
-1
TI MIE
60.
IMPO
ALL
PRINT
1
0.0
RUN
60.
30. 10. 1.5 4.2
30. 10. 1.5 4.2
1.00
1.00
30. .10. 1.5 4.2 1.0
5. 1 0E- OE07
1 .000E-04
1 OOOE-04
1.000E-04
1. OOOE-04
1.000E-04
1 . OOOE-03
.000E-03
I .000E-03
1 .000E-03
7.500E-05
1 .000E-02
2.000E-03
3.700E-02
1. 000E03
. o00 E-04
1 .OOOE-03
1 .000E-03
1 .000E-03
1.000E-04
3. 700E-02
2.000E-03
30. 20. 1.5 4.2 1.0
30.
30.
30.
30.
20. 1.5 4.2 1.0
20. 1.5 4.2 1.0
30. 1.5 4.2 1.0
30. 1.5 4.2 1.0
30. 30.
5. 5.
1 TOTL NONE NONE
-1
SIMUL
2
1200 1220703125 .50
1.5 4.2 1.0
L
L
L
L
L
L
U
U
L
U
L
L
U
L
U
L
U
U
L
L
U
L
U
AUX. FEED WATER SYSTEM REL. ANALYSIS.
33
COP
NEW
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Table C.1 Continued
30.0
10.
10.
10, L 3. L 3. L 10.
10.
30.
10. L 3.9 L 3.0 L 10.
10. L 3.0 L 3.0 L 10.
10. L 3.0 L 3.0 L 10.
10.
10.0 L 3.0 L 3.0 L 10.0
10.0 L 3.0 L 3.0 L 10.0
END
L
L
L
L 10.
L
L
L
L 10.
L
L
L
L. 3.
L. 3.0
10.
10.0
10.0
L 3.0 L10.
L 3.0 L 10.
3.0
10.
L
L
L
1.
.
I-I,
LI.
L,
L
10.
L 3.0 L 3.0 L 10.0
10.t0.
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Table C.2: RESULTS OF UNRAC FOR THE SAMPLE
PROBLEM
TABLE -1 FAULT TREE LOGIC
GATE GATE INPIUT COr.P. OR GATES
NO. TYPE
24 0 1 25 28 0 0 0
25 1 26 27 0 0 0 0
26 0 2 3 0 0 0 0
27 0 4 5 0 0 0 0
23 1 29 30 0 0 0 0
29 0 7 6 9 810 0
30 0 11 12 31 0 0 0
31 1 32 33 0 0 0 0
32 0 13 14 15 16 17 19
33 0 18 19 20 21 22 23
MINO IND LIN I I
0 0 145 146 145
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Table C.2 Continued (sheet 2)
a TOTAL NUMBER OF CUT SET GENERATED = 145 *
NO. OF COMP.
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
TIME CONSUJIED .0
IN C. S COMPONENTS NOS.
1
2 4
7 11
3 4
2 5
6 11
9 11
8 11
10 11
7 12
7 13 1R
3 5
6 12
6 13 18
9 12
9 13 18
8 12
8 13 18
lO 12
10 13 1t
7 14 18
7 15 18
7 16 1
7 17 18
7 19
7 17 23
7 13 20
7 13 21
7 13 22
7 13 23
6 14 18
6 15 18
6 16 18
6 17 18
6 19
6 17 23
6 13 20
6 13 21
6 13 22
6 13 23
9 14 18
S 15 18
9 16 18
9 17 18
- 2
NO.
TABLE
CUT SET
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
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Table C.2 Continued (sheet 3)
TABLE - 2 CONTINUED ..
CUT SET NO. NO. OF COMP.
45 2
46 3
47 3
48 3
49 3
50 3
51 3
52 3
53 3
54 3
55 2
56 3
57 3
58 3
59 3
60 3
61 3
62 3
63 3
64 3
65 2
66 3
67 3
68 '3
69 3
70 3
71 3
72 3
73 3
74 3
75 3
76 3
77 3
78 3
79 3
80 3
81 3
82 3
83 3
84 3
85 3
86 3
87 3
88 3
89 3
IN. C., S.. COMPONENTS NOS .
9 17 23
9 13 20
9 13 21
9 13 22
9 13 23
8 14 18
8 15 8
8 16 18
8 17 18
8 19
8 17 23
8 13 20
,8 13 21
·a 13 22 v
8 1323
10 14 18
10 15 18
10 16 18
10 17 18
10 19 
10 17 23
'0 13 20
10 13 21
10 13 22
1,0 13 23
7 17 22
7 14 20
7 14 21
7 14 22
7 14 23
7 17 21
7 15 20
7 15 21
7 15 22
7 15 23
7 17 20
7 16 20.
7 16 21
7 16 22
7 16 23
6 17 22
6 14 20
6 14 21
6 14'22
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Table C.2 Continued (sheet 4)
TABLE - 2 CONTINUED :
NO. NO, OF COMP. IN C S.
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
COMPONENTS tOS.
6 14 23
6 17' 21
6 1E 20
6 15 21
6 15 22
6 15 23
6 17 20
6 16 20
6 16 21
6 f 622
6 16 23
9 17 22
9 !4 20
9 14 21
9 14 22
9 14 23
9 17 21
9 15 20
9 15 21
9 15 22
9 15 23
9 17 20
9 16 20
9 16 21
9 16 22
9 16 23
8 17 22
8 14 20
8 14 21
8 14 22
8 14 23
8 17 21
8 15 20
8 I5 21
8 15 22
8 15 23
8 17 20
8 16 20
8 16 21
8 16 22
8 16 23
10 17 22
10 14 20
10 14 21
10 14 22
CUT SET
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
18a
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
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Table .C. 2 Continued (sheet 5)
TABLE - 2 CONTINUED :
NO. NO. OF COUP. IN C. S.
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3.
C0OPONENTS NOS.
10 14 23
10 17 21
10 15 20
10 15 21
10 15 22
10 15 23
10 17 20
10 16 20
10 16 21
10 16 22
10 16 23
*,. TIr,7E USED TO GENERATE THE lMIN. CUT SETS. WAS .0 SCONDS ***
*e NiOTE : I THE TABLE 3 COLU,'NS 8 , 9 REPRESENT FOUR DIFFERENT VARIABLES;
WHEN TEST INTERVAL IS ZERO THEN
COL. 8 S'P3 ( PROBAB. THAT MONTIOR COMP. NEED THOUR'OUH TESTING)
COL. 9 IS P1 (PROB. THAT THE FAIL. IS SPURIOUS)
'HEN TEST INTERVAL S NON-ZERO THE.VALUES ARE AS WRITTEN,
CUT SET
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
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Table C.2 Continued (sheet 8)
INPUT DATA FOR IMPORTANCE ANALYSIS
TYPE OF CALCULATION a ALL
TIME OF EVALUATION a 0.0
AVERAGE OR POINT ESTIMATE TOP EVENT UNRELIABILITY ISa 3.14970-04
280
Table C,2 Continued (sheet 9)
TAB.LE - 5 ;
FUSSE LL-VES ELY AND BI RN AUM'§ S' MA SURE' OF IMPORTANCE
FUSSELL-VESELY
MEASURE
1.6192E-03
6.3498E-05
6.3498E-05
6.349 3E-05
6.3498E-05
4.6507E-03
1 .5392E-01
6.4245E-01
4.6607E-02
1.5061E-01
5.1001E-03
6.8001E-01
2.4262E-02
1.5115E-01
1 .3235E-02
4.0850E-04
5.6086E-02
5.6619E-02
6.8001E-02
4.0807E-04
1 .298;E-02
1 .5098E-01
2.4139E-02
BIRNBAUM'S
MEASURE
1 .E0000E+00
2.0000E-04
2,OOOOE-04
2. 0000E-04
2. 0000 E-04
1 .4660E-02
t .4680E-02
1 .4680E-02
1 .4680E-02
1.4680E-02
2. 1419E-02
2.1419E-02
1.2867E-03
1 .2887E-03
1 .2867E-03
1.2867E-03
1 .2867E-03
1.2853E-03
2.1419E-02
1.2853E-03
1 .2853E-03
1.2853E-03
1 .2853E-03
COMPONENT
* 140,
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
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Table C. 2 Continued (sheet 13)
AUX. FEED WATER RELIABILITY ANALYSIS.
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS 23
NUt.8ER OF TRIALS a 1200
*** COMPONENT VALUE
LAMDA DIS
PARAMETER SPREAD
TC DIS
& DISTRIBUTION
TR DIS QRESID DIS
* 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
L 3.000
0.0
L 3. 00
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
L 3.000
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
L 3.000
0.0
0.0
L 3.000
0.0
L 3.000
30.000
10. 000
10. 000
10.000
10. 000
10.000
L 10.000
L 10.000
10.000
L 10.000
30.000
3.000
L 10.000
10.000
L 10.000
10.000
L 10.000
L 10.000
10.000
10.000
L 10.000
13.000
L 10.000
COMPONENT
NO.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
10.000
10.000
0.0
10.000
0.0
0.0
0.0
10.000
0.0
10.000
10.000
0.0
0.0
10.000
0.0
10.000
I
L
L
L
L
.L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
iL
L
iIiii
i
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Table C.2 Continued (sheet 14)
S** AUX. FEED WATER RELIABILITY ANALYSIS.
DISTRIBUTED VALUES:
MEDIAN POINT VALUE = 3.1497E-04
TRUE MEDIAN * 5.9415E-04
ERROR FACTOR · 7.2066E+00
MEAN = 1.2970D-03
STANDAR3 DEVIATION = 3.2431D-03
5% EOjND = 1.3432E-04
95% 3uN0D a 4.2818E-03
BETA 1 · 1.63760+02
BETA 2 a 2.3341D+02
THIRD CENT. MOMENT= 4.3648D-07
4TH CENT. MOMENT= 2.58190-08
286
000000000000000000000
0 I t I I 0 a a I t aI I C - N a a C I
oo0000000000000.00000
0 I- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Iaa
*a c a _ o . _- o 0 a i I a A _ A u A
0000000000000000000000
CD Vr r C o rC 0; 0; 0; 0; 0n ; : 0 r O N r tD
* in . .
" 000000000000000000000
wIIIIiwww xIwwexw IIi
.i- . . . .. .. OO. o. 
r z
w to o
' S 0D
a a)
LU W O 0mQ U C d OOOO)O OUa00,
2 t
287
Table C.2 Continued (sheet 16)
END OF CALCULATION B UNRAC
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